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**IMPROVING THE READINESS OF U.S.
FORCES THROUGH MILITARY JOINTNESS**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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IMPROVING THE READINESS OF U.S. FORCES THROUGH MILITARY JOINTNESS

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[There were no Documents submitted.]

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[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

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IMPROVING THE READINESS OF U.S. FORCES THROUGH MILITARY JOINTNESS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS,
Washington, DC, Thursday, March 31, 2011.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:00 p.m. in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Mr. FORBES. We want to welcome all of our members and our distinguished panel of experts to today's hearing that will focus on how we are progressing toward improvements in the readiness of our forces through military jointness.

I want to begin by apologizing to our panel for having the votes come up the way they did and a little bit of delay. And several of our members, we have got a couple of called meetings for some of the freshmen, so they may be coming in and out. So we appreciate your understanding of that as they do.

This topic is particularly relevant with the pending closure of the Joint Forces Command or JFCOM. Ironically, the impetus for JFCOM was that landmark legislation on jointness, Goldwater-Nichols. Let me first take a step back in history and a special message to Congress in 1958. President Dwight D. Eisenhower stated that separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again, we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements with all Services as one, single concentrated effort.

However, President Eisenhower's vision was not fully realized until the passage of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that the U.S. military indeed has made significant gains in joint operations, training and doctrine. However, there are still areas impacting the readiness of our forces that need to be addressed.

We still must develop jointness in the way we communicate, procure our weapons systems and in our logistics processes and information systems. That once would have been the ongoing role of JFCOM. In announcing the closure of JFCOM, Secretary Gates said the U.S. military has largely embraced jointness as a matter of culture and practice, although we must always remain vigilant against backsliding on this front.

In reality, it is my contention that we cannot simply focus on what we have achieved to date and try to avoid a backslide, but

rather, we must continue to advance joint concepts in terms of doctrine, training and development of strategies and tactics, since each scenario we face in the future will call for joint operations but potentially differing responses.

For example, the growing military power of China and its potential threat to the Asia/Pacific region would call for a different joint response from U.S. military forces, possibly more focused on an air-sea operation than the current CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] operations which primarily are land-based.

I would ask our witnesses their view on how we can be assured this forward look at jointness will happen without a body that has the authority to force that on the Services. The Joint Staff has played the role of principal military adviser to our senior civilian leadership. Even if they develop the necessary concepts to further jointness, how will they be able to press Services into compliance?

In a recent speech at the Air Force Academy, Secretary Gates said it is easier to be joint and talk joint when there is money to go around and a war to be won. He said, it is much harder to do when tough choices have to be made within and between the military Services, between what is ideal from a particular Service perspective and what will get the job done, taking into account broader priorities and considerations.

I agree with Secretary Gates in this regard, resistant bureaucracies exist within every part of the executive branch, and the Service departments within the Pentagon are no different.

Another critical readiness factor is that of the role of Joint Force provider. Jointness dictates that the Services operate within their core competencies and seek the expertise of the Service whose skills line of particular competency, including training. In the new construct, it is unclear who will take on this responsibility, but in order to truly promote jointness, it cannot be given to one particular military Service.

Finally, the operations with our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies pose another concern. An example of their importance to our security interest is being reinforced even as we sit here with the operations over Libya, which this committee heard about this morning.

JFCOM provided several venues in which U.S. and allied forces could interact. That dynamic cannot help but change.

Indeed, French Air Force General Stephane Abrial, Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, or ACT, in discussing the NATO role after the closure of JFCOM, told reporters that ACT has started looking at how we will replug into this much more distributed system.

Joining us today to discuss these issues are three distinguished individuals: General Raymond Odierno, Commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command. General Odierno most recently served as Commanding General for the Multi-National Force—Iraq, working jointly with our allies. He also has served in other senior joint positions in the Pentagon. These assignments have more than prepared him for ensuring that the military's focus remains on jointness, even as JFCOM is disestablished.

Vice Admiral William E. Gortney, Director of the Joint Staff. While primarily serving in senior Navy commands throughout his

career, Admiral Gortney has stated that Goldwater-Nichols substantially helped his career. Now as director of the Joint Staff, Admiral Gortney is uniquely positioned to reinforce his personal commitment to jointness.

Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, President, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Dr. Krepinevich is a well-known military expert and currently serves on the Joint Forces Command's Transformational Advisory Board. He has been involved with JFCOM since its beginning.

Gentlemen, we thank you all for being here.

I now recognize my good friend, the ranking member, Ms. Bordallo, for any remarks she may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I know that the topic of today's hearing is very important to our chairman, so I will keep my remarks rather brief.

First, I would like to welcome Admiral Gortney. Thank you.

And General Odierno, thank you for testifying.

And also Dr. Krepinevich. Is that correct?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Krepinevich.

Ms. BORDALLO. And I want to thank the General and the Admiral for their visit in my office yesterday.

General, as you know and I must mention how proud I am of our Guam reservists and our National Guardsmen who served with you in Iraq. And thank you for taking good care of my men and women when they were serving there. We are all very proud of them back home.

Today's hearing focuses on ensuring that jointness in the U.S. military operation continues and is enhanced to promote our readiness to respond to threats to national security.

The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 was a major step forward in the reorganization of the Department of Defense to enhance operational synergies across all the Services. The First Gulf War proved that Goldwater-Nichols had made substantial improvements in joint operations. And to this day, the U.S. military continues to be the best prepared force to fight jointly.

The total force concept of jointness is proven. It works, and it makes our military more ready and more capable. As we look to the future, it is important for both the Congress and the Department of Defense to ensure that our military can operate effectively in a joint environment.

We must find ways to maximize organizational efficiencies, and we must ensure that we maintain our focus on core joint strengths, such as training, doctrine, manpower sourcing and simulation.

I look forward today to hearing from our witnesses on how they will continue to maintain the strength of our total force and what steps are being taken to improve joint training requirements.

I have expressed concerns about training requirements in past readiness hearings, so I am interested in understanding what steps

are being taken to ensure more consistency in training requirements across all the Services and how the Joint Staff would support Pacific Command in its efforts to address training in the Pacific as dictated in the Quadrennial Defense Review.

So, again, Mr. Chairman and to the witnesses, I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses.

Thank you.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you for those remarks, Madeleine.

As we discussed prior to the hearing, I ask unanimous consent that we dispense with the 5-minute rule for this hearing and depart from regular order so that members may ask questions during the course of the discussion. I think this will provide a roundtable type forum and will enhance the dialogue on these very important issues.

Without objection, so ordered.

Gentlemen, we appreciate you being here. I want to just take a moment and tell you that our format is a little bit different than some of the subcommittees. We have probably, I think, one of the most bipartisan committees in Congress. We work very well together, and so what we do is try to ask our questions in a little more logical framework than you might see in some other subcommittees.

The other thing I want to do is tell you how much we appreciate you being here.

General, you have got a lot of stars on your shoulder. They weren't given to you; we know that you earned those. And we just respect that service, and we respect what you have done for our country and for you being here.

Admiral, we appreciate your service. And I know that you are kind of new to the hearing circuit, and so we hope you have a good experience today and thank you for being here.

Dr. Krepinevich, we thank you so much for your contribution to jointness. And I don't do this very often, but I commend your book to anyone who wants to read it. It is just excellent, and I think it is a true eye-opener.

The other thing I want to encourage you to do is, this is not a gotcha time or moment. If there is anything that you just left out that you want to come back in and do, take the time you need to do it.

One of the witnesses has completed something and you want to extrapolate on that, please feel free to do it. If you rethink something afterwards and you just want to come back or you didn't get all the time you need, let us know, and we want you to be able to do that.

So thank you all for being here.

And with that, General, we would love to have you start off.

We are going to just, so you know for the record, we have taken all of your written remarks, and we make them a part of the record. Don't feel like you have to regurgitate them to us, but if it feels more comfortable to do it, we are going to leave that up to you. And if you would take about 5 minutes or so each, and then we will go into our questions.

General.

**STATEMENT OF GEN RAY ODIERNO, USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
JOINT FORCES COMMAND**

General ODIERNO. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Ms. Bordallo, other distinguished members of the committee, thank you so much.

I think it is an important topic we are here to discuss today. Obviously, readiness today and in the future of our Joint Force is key to us being successful in the future.

I would just like to go back to my time in Iraq where, from 2003, when I was a division commander, through my time as Multi-National Corps—Iraq Commander to Multi-National Force—Iraq to U.S. Forces—Iraq, I got to personally witness as a joint commander the growth that we had in our joint and multinational operations. Whether it be from intelligence collection, whether it be from targeting, whether it be from Joint Staff operations, it increased exponentially.

And I believe that is what the Secretary of Defense was talking about when this has become more routine. From 2003 and 2011, our ability to establish and routinely conduct joint operations has become much more routine.

I think we have witnessed that in Afghanistan and Iraq. We have witnessed that in Libya. We have witnessed that in the Pacific during the crisis in Japan, and we have witnessed it in Haiti and other places. So forming joint task forces, understanding the roles and capabilities of the Services, has significantly improved.

That said, it is something that we must continue to look at, improve and have the processes in place so we can continue to modify and improve our Joint Force as we meet the many difficult challenges that we will face in the coming years. And I certainly recognize this as a former Joint Force commander.

As I first got the Joint Forces Command, I had this in mind; when I originally looked at what Joint Forces Command was doing, what was it doing to support the combatant commanders, what was it doing to support the Services, what were the core functions that needed to remain, so we could, most importantly, not only sustain but improve our jointness in the future, and we identified some key core functions: One being, first and foremost, joint-enabled collective and individual training; second, the development of joint—continued development of joint concepts through lessons learned; third, the development of joint doctrine; and, finally, all of this underpinned by modeling, simulation and experimentation.

And those are the core functions that will remain as we move forward and that will be the key for us in sustaining and continuing to improve our jointness.

And, in fact, I believe, as we move forward, we are eliminating bureaucracy that was unnecessary and that I hope will streamline the process that will make us more responsive to the many complex challenges we have ahead. So I look forward to having a further discussion today about that.

I appreciate your concerns, and I very much believe that this is an important conversation that we are having. So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Odierno can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.

Admiral, thank you for being here and the mike is all yours.

**STATEMENT OF VADM WILLIAM E. GORTNEY, USN, DIRECTOR,
JOINT STAFF, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

Admiral GORTNEY. Thank you, Chairman, Ms. Bordallo.

Jointness is the philosophy that underpins the United States' strategy and operational application of the military. And today's senior military officers are products of Goldwater-Nichols reform, and most service members have never experienced operations in anything but the joint environment.

In fact, our young officers, O-4 and below and senior enlisted E-7 and below, it is all they know, as they raised their right hand 10 years ago, volunteered to serve their Nation in time of war and fight in joint operations.

As a director of the Joint Staff, I see the focus on jointness in our service members every single day, in the last 10 years, 6 of the last 10 years overseas at the operational and tactical level in one of those capacities working for the General here as his maritime commander.

The chairman, by law and policy and intent, is charged with maintaining jointness. He does this now, and he will continue to do it after JFCOM is disestablished. In order to do so, we are establishing a three-star J7 director on the Joint Staff being specifically charged with Joint Force development. And the pillars of Joint Force development were very well explained by the General here. J7 partners today with JFCOM in these endeavors and will execute them tomorrow in a flatter, more efficient, more responsive organization.

In reality, this is less about a COCOM [combatant command] going away and more about DOD [the Department of Defense] figuring out a better way to perform joint oversight and ensuring joint readiness, thereby providing a better value for the American taxpayer, and I look forward to taking your questions, sir.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral.

Doctor.

**STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, PRESIDENT,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS**

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you, Congresswoman Bordallo.

My testimony really addresses three questions, first, why was Joint Forces Command created in the first place?

I happened to be on the ground floor of its creation. Back in 1997, I was serving on the National Defense Panel. We were tasked to look out 15 or 20 years into the future to try and get a handle on what kind of security challenges we would confront, quite frankly, in the decade we are entering now.

Our conclusion was that we were in for a period of disruptive change, that we would be facing new and very different kinds of security challenges. And as we did that, we looked back to the past to say, well, how did military organizations that are confronted with disruptive change, how do they successfully navigate that?

And we found in many instances, it was through a period of deep thinking where they put some of their best thinkers to work on what General Odierno said is concept development, you know, what is a way to deal well this new problem, and then second, war games, more recently simulations, and then ultimately field exercises to test out those ideas, so that we were sure that we were buying, as sure as we could be, the right kind of equipment, developing the right kind of capabilities and so on.

Our idea was that these operations, as you have said, Mr. Chairman, quoting President Eisenhower, were going to be inherently joint, so the Services individually could not come up with the answers or the solutions to these problems.

And then, finally, the idea was there needed to be a senior officer that, in my terminology, spoke for the COCOM after next, the commander that would be in the field 5 to 8 to 10 years into the future, because nobody really speaks for that person right now. We don't know who he is; he doesn't know who he is. So somebody has got to be there when we are setting the requirements for capabilities that, quite frankly, aren't going to be in place today but will only be in place over time when that commander has to take the responsibility for his or her particular command.

I think that concern has been validated over time: 1997, we had some perception of what might be emerging. Now I think it is much clearer. We have the Chinese and the Iranians developing what we call anti-access/area denial capabilities that are designed to push us out of the western Pacific and the Persian Gulf.

We have the diffusion of guided weaponry to the point where there are concerns that even nonstate entities, like Hezbollah, will get these weapons and create a new form of modern insurgency or irregular warfare; a situation where if Iran gets nuclear weapons, you will have an inherently unstable nuclear balance in the Middle East between Iran and Israel; concerns about Pakistan, who has four reactors, either in production or underway, to produce plutonium, to make far more nuclear weapons than they can absorb locally; the issue of prospective loss of assured access to space and cyber space. We have already seen the Chinese take out satellites at low-Earth orbit, and yet that is where we continue to put satellites into for the most part, and then the major issue of cyber space.

You know, these are all presenting us with strategic problems or military problems that we need answers to, that the Defense Department and the President need answers to, to decide if, in fact, these problems are soluble; if so, what kinds of capabilities and doctrine we are going to need; or do we need to pursue an alternative strategy with all its implications for forces, force structure, doctrine and equipment?

Now, my second question is, how well does Joint Forces Command accomplish this mission of representing the COCOM after next of looking into the future and helping us position ourselves to anticipate what is coming as opposed to react to it. My conclusion is, not particularly well.

There have been a number of reasons for this. It hasn't been for a lack of hard-working people. It hasn't been for a lack of talented people.

I think, certainly, one thing that has occurred is the consequences of two wars and the enormous demand signal that that has placed on the command, and the obvious and logical conclusion that you have got to support the war we have got but, again, the need to balance that with preparing for the future.

Second, a resistance by the military Services. Prospectively, when you engage in this process of discovery and identification of new ways of conducting operations, ultimately you are going to create winners and losers, winners and losers among and within the Services, winners and losers among programs. And the Services jealously guard their program of record and their responsibility for setting requirements.

Third, I think, is the lack of top cover. I don't think it was ever particularly well understood, either by a series of Defense Secretaries or in some cases even the Joint Forces Command commander, as to what exactly this all meant in terms of joint concept development and experimentation, and that is based on my conversations with a number of them.

Then there was the fact that the commander of Joint Forces Command was never really involved in setting requirements, no membership on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, no membership on the Defense Acquisition Board.

Then there was the fact that even though typically these kinds of major changes in doctrine force structure take the better part of a decade, the commander of Joint Forces Command typically had a very short tenure, 2 years, 3 years, when, in fact, if the job was being done well, he probably needed two concurrent 3-year command tours.

And, finally, the tendency in some cases to outsource thinking, the civilian support in the J9 shop almost became legendary, not only down there but up here. Again, a lot of good people, but history indicates that in concept development, you really need military professionals who are really expert in terms of strategy, development of operational concepts, and I don't think we ever got to that point with respect to J9.

Third, is this mission still important? I would argue it is more important now than ever. I don't oppose the disestablishment of Joint Forces Command, but I definitely feel as though this mission cannot afford to be an orphan any longer, that it has got to be given serious consideration. Otherwise, I think we are going to be continuously surprised over the next 10 years of what our rivals and adversaries are doing to us rather than being well prepared for it, anticipating it and being in a position to deter aggression or coercion or respond effectively if that fails.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Krepinevich can be found in the Appendix on page 48.]

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Doctor. I am going to defer my questions until the end because I want to make sure our members get to ask all of theirs.

And so I am going to turn now to my colleague, the ranking member, Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I have a question for you with regard to joint training. I understand that the Services have made significant gains in developing new training opportunities using modeling and simulation tools. Further, I know these advances in training techniques have contributed to our efforts to help train our coalition partners around the world.

What is the next step for the Services to evolve further and share these cutting-edge training capabilities with each other in today's distributed environment? And the second part of the question is, how will the Joint Staff encourage the combatant commands and Services to fully utilize new technologies to meet current future training requirements?

Admiral GORTNEY. Ma'am, I think the answer to your first question is that the Services are all finding that modeling and simulation are one of the best training values for the dollar spent. You can get, in particular areas, the best quality training that you can through a simulation. It does not fully replace live fire, say live fire training, large exercise, but any time that you can work the simulation piece in there at the right level for the right cost, it is a very good return on investment.

And on the Joint Staff, we are going to continue to do that. Modeling and simulation is one thing that is one of the tasks that is not going away. With JFCOM's disestablishment, it will be using the same facility, but it will be reporting to the three-star on the J7.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral.
General.

General ODIERNO. Ma'am, could I add something to that, please?

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. General.

General ODIERNO. What I would like to—your points are very good. And, in fact, we just finished the most complex modeling simulation exercise that we have done where we incorporated an exercise preparing units from Afghanistan. We included a German division out of Europe, a Marine division out of Camp Lejeune and an Army division out of Fort Hood, Texas, all virtually who are able to conduct an exercise by preparing themselves to go to Afghanistan. It was run by Joint Forces Command. It was completely joint and multinational in every way.

Our capability to do that type of exercise is going to remain, in total, in Suffolk, Virginia, in the Joint War Fighting Center. The only difference now is it will report directly to the Joint Staff J7. We think that is key and then the modeling and concept and experimentation fees will be there together for the first time, instead of separate. And being together, we hope that that will facilitate more coordination to look at future challenges that we will have. That is the concept that we have put together for this.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General.

I have a question for you, General or Admiral. Can either of you comment on the success of the implementation of the new Joint Officer Management Program and the joint qualification system? Has the opportunities to gain joint credit through experience yielded a greater number of joint qualified officers, and are there any hiccups to this new process or unintended second- or third-order effects through the new requirements for military officers to endeavor to

be fully joint qualified? Are there any legislative changes necessary to further refine the process for the Active Guard or Reserve members?

General ODIERNO. I would say that the operational experience piece of getting joint experience has been fundamentally important, especially over these last 10 years, since many of our joint jobs have been, in fact, in operational deployed areas. And that has helped us significantly getting credit for individuals who are actually performing on the ground, joint tasked together. So I think that has gone well.

We still have some education that has to be done internal to all the Services to make sure the officers understand that they get the appropriate credit for what they are doing, and we are still working our way through that.

Secondly, I would just say, is I think we just went over the last hurdle, because our operational trainer specifically in Joint Forces Command—which I would consider probably the most joint job we have—because they are responsible for training the Joint Force was, by legislation, not included to be considered inherently joint. We have now corrected that, and we are on our way to correcting that, so I think that is a very positive step forward.

Ms. BORDALLO. Admiral.

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, ma'am.

And that program is actually run through the Joint Staff today, and we have, since its inception, over 2,400 officers have been able to be joint qualified as a result of that to include the active and the Reserve. Before, the Reserve were not able to become joint qualified.

We see no hurdles, other than maybe an IT, IT technology on database management on how to do that and tracking. We have worked our way through that. We think it is a terrific program, and we want to expand it as much as we possibly can.

Ms. BORDALLO. Good. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back, but I do have a couple of other questions later on.

Mr. FORBES. We will come back to you after everybody else, Ms. Bordallo, if that is okay.

The gentleman from Nevada, Mr. Heck, is now recognized for 5 minutes.

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and for your service.

General, my time in Iraq happened to be during the 7 months that you were on hiatus in 2008, so we didn't cross paths, but I can attest to the jointness of the operation and am proud and honored, as an Army guy, to wear the First MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force] patch as my right sleeve patch and having spent some time in your neck of the woods when I was at Joint Forces Staff College undergoing my advanced joint professional military education.

I would like first to follow up on the JQO [Joint Qualified Officer] issue raised by the ranking member. I can tell you that while there are more opportunities for reservists to get joint qualified, it is a very difficult process because of the number of billets that are on the JTMD [Joint Table of Manning and Distribution] and the

JMD [Joint Manning Document]. And I will just say that even though through the self-nominative process, you are able to get the education and get some points for exercises and other education, it is extremely difficult for reservists. And I would hope that we would open up other avenues for those in the Guard and the Reserve to get their JQO.

Can you tell me what the plan is for the Joint Forces unmanned vehicle management systems, specifically the unmanned aircraft systems of excellence—the Center of Excellence, out of Creech?

General ODIERNO. Congressman, initially, the joint unmanned aerial system task force is going to be sunset. The plan was for it to sunset in the end of 2012. We have moved that forward to the end of 2011, so the organization itself will sunset.

But what will happen is the Joint Staff under the J-8 is going to create individuals there to continue to have oversight of the Service programs that continue on for not only the aerial but all of unmanned systems as we move forward. We think it is time to do that. We think we have the Services focused in the right areas on this and with the J-8 oversight, we think that is appropriate for us to continue to monitor as we move forward.

Dr. HECK. So it will be a J-8 function for the Joint Staff. Any idea on where that—is that going to be another center of excellence or something that is going to be stood up the somewhere?

General ODIERNO. It is going to be an 8- to 10-man cell stood up on the Joint Staff in the J-8 with the sole purpose of monitoring and overseeing the Services in conducting both unmanned aerial and other unmanned systems.

Dr. HECK. So it is being pushed back out to the Services to do the work with an oversight cell.

General ODIERNO. That is right.

Dr. HECK. Thank you.

I yield back, Mr. Chair.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Joe.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Kissell, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to our witnesses.

I have to say, General Odierno, it is good to see you here in Washington. The last time I saw you was in Baghdad.

One of the things, when I was spending many years in business, it seemed like there were times when we were successful at things and things were going well; then someone higher up decided, well, you can do without this, you can do without that.

Also, the decision has been made, and I do have great concerns about this jointness. I can remember, I believe it was the invasion of Grenada, we had a famous story about somebody having to call somebody at Washington to speak to somebody at the Pentagon to call somebody else because there was no way to coordinate.

We had a readiness hearing not long ago, and we had members from the four branches of service in. And I asked them, what is the biggest deficiency that they face, and three of the four branches said time, time for training.

If that is the issue, where are we going to find time, not only to train in their particular expertise of their Service, but also time for

the joint aspect of what we need to do? And will the lack of this position that will coordinate, how is that going to affect us?

General or Admiral, if you all could give me some thoughts, I would appreciate it.

General ODIERNO. Sure. First, on the training side, I would just say what is happening now among all the Services is they are training for the mission at hand.

For example, in the Army, units getting ready to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan, they are training in a joint concept to prepare themselves to operate on the specific contingency that they are able to do, and the other Services are doing the same.

So the concern is, they don't have the time to train across the broad spectrum of missions that could come up under contingencies, and that is the concern with time.

So what we have done is, with the time we have, we develop joint exercises, both at the highest level of command, whether it be the JTF [Joint Task Force] itself, division, a brigade, a group, a wing, a squadron, and we continue to get them incorporated into the joint training as well as, at the lowest levels, preparing them for the environment that they are going to operate in a joint multinational environment. That is occurring.

What is lacking is if they have to go do something else, and that is what they are not having the time to do, and that is the concern.

Mr. KISSELL. Dr. Krepinevich, we have kind of left you out of the conversation here, so I want to get you back involved. Am I correct in opening remarks that you maybe don't agree that this is a decision that we should be making in closing down the center?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. As I said, I don't disagree with the decision to shut down Joint Forces Command. My primary concern is that the original mission for which it was established was never really accomplished by the command.

I am hoping that in the wake of its disestablishment, this mission will find a true home and true support.

If you look at Joint Forces Command and especially in terms of the mission of Joint Force trainer, Joint Force provider, those were missions initially assigned to Atlantic Command in 1993. Now, when Joint Forces Command was created in 1999, the futures mission was with the add-on. That was the purpose for disestablishing Atlantic Command. But, again, I am sorry to say that despite the efforts of many good people, we still haven't gotten traction on preparing for what some people call the next big thing.

General ODIERNO. If I could just add to that, I don't disagree with what Dr. Krepinevich is saying. In fact, as we went through this review, we found that there were some core functions that I believe were not being done to the best of our abilities. So it is not only a disestablishment of the four-star headquarters, but it is actually a reorganization of how we want to better impact our Joint Force, and we are reorganizing ourselves, in my mind, so we gain better synchronization and integration.

And we are doing it by putting, building a center which will remain in Norfolk, which has been a large investment put in there for modeling, simulation, experimentation, for us to look to the future, as well as today, and better synchronize what we are doing

between concept development doctrine and our training as we look ahead, so that is the intent.

So it is not going away. It is the four-star piece of it and the four-star proponent that is going away, but many of the key pieces will remain and be reorganized to address some of the problems, actually, that Dr. Krepinevich has brought up in his testimony.

Now, we will have to continue to review this over time to ensure that we are, in fact, doing the things we think we should be doing, and that will be something we have to pay attention to. And it will be up to the chairman, vice-chairman and the J7 to do those reviews as we move forward.

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Kissell.

The gentleman from New York, Mr. Gibson, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

And I appreciate the distinguished panel being here today. Discussion has been productive.

The first one is just a process question. With the disestablishment of JFCOM, will the remaining command have any role in the global force management process?

General ODIERNO. What will happen is the expertise that we have built in Norfolk to do global force management will remain. It will become part of the J-3 of the Joint Staff. And as they do global force management, they will then do that, and the J-3 will then bring it to the Secretary of Defense, who actually has the authority to make the decisions on Global Force Management through advisement by the chairman, and that will continue.

Mr. GIBSON. Okay, very well. And then just to really reinforce some of the comments made earlier, I think what is clear with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that at the individual leader and collective level across the force, there is great confidence, joint confidence in the formations, particularly in counterinsurgency operations.

But I would like to take this point that General Odierno made moments ago to another level about some of the risk we are carrying about full spectrum operations. In my last assignment, I led the Army's component of the Global Response Force, and it was my assessment that given the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we were accepting a great deal of risk in our Global Response Force, and that was understandable, given the decision that higher level commanders had to make.

But going forward, particularly when you look at the budget and what is forecasted in terms of troop levels and assumptions with regard to Afghanistan, when we are going to complete our combat task there, how is that going to impact Joint Forces Command and the Joint Staff as they look to try to reduce the risk in terms of our joint readiness?

I would point to, not just the joint forceable entry exercises that we did, but also the deployment that we did to Haiti, certainly Herculean effort done by the GRF [Global Response Force], but we trickled in. We really didn't have enough sorties to get the force on

the ground fast enough, and that was some trade-offs based on other theaters.

But as we look at full spectrum, how are we, from the training perspective, going to manage that risk, and largely we are probably talking about staff tasks here, so we are talking about simulations? And how we are going to ensure we have the cadence, the reputation and cadence to build that competency? And then from the management of the readiness side, how are we going to track that and ensure that we are communicating the risk to the President and to the Secretary of Defense?

General ODIERNO. I think that, first off, we do that on a quite regular basis, understanding where our shortfalls are, what we can and can't do. And I think the chairman takes a lot of time in making sure that both the Secretary of Defense and the President understands what those risks are.

You know, we don't know the unknown. I mean, I think the thought process is with us finishing our commitment in Iraq here at the end of the year, that that will allow us to start to do some of the things we have not been able to do. But I hesitate to say that because the unknown is the unknown, and we never know what other commitments could come up.

But I think the thought process across the force is that we have to start folks in on other areas, and Dr. Krepinevich mentioned China, and that is an important one and what our role will be there and how we prepare ourselves.

He also mentioned anti-access. That is something that we are really starting to take a hard look now and how we are going to do that. So those are the kinds of things we absolutely have to stay focused on and prepare our forces so that they are prepared to respond. But, again, time is an issue and the amount of our commitment of our forces and how long that remains will always be an issue and whether we are able to meet these other demands that you have mentioned.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I would also like to add, sir, that not 100 percent of the force is focused on Iraq and Afghanistan; not 100 percent of the force owns the same amount of risk and being able to fight through the full spectrum of conflict. So you will see a large majority of your Navy and your Air Force that are focused on the high-end war, while we are accepting risk and because of the capacity and the near-term fight for the Army and the Marine Corps.

And as we draw down, you are going to see that shift again because the Service chiefs clearly recognize that need to be able to full—full spectrum ops.

Mr. GIBSON. Thank you. And as we manage this risk and as we develop competency, I also envision this is going to help our diplomats and, really, the Administration as they work to advance our interests. When we can demonstrate a capability to deploy Joint Forces, followed by early entry forces, followed by campaign forces and sustainment forces, even in an exercise, I think that will be more meaningful when we deal with situations, perhaps in Iran, Korea, China.

As you know, I mean, really deterrence is about capability and will. If you have got will and no capability, you don't have deterrence. And vice versa, if you have got capability and no will.

So I see this piece of this, restoring the joint readiness to a more acceptable level of risk, is actually going to help our country manage our overall risk and advance our interest in the out-years.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. Doctor, did you have a response that you wanted to make to that or did I—

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Yes, just a brief one.

I think the issue here is the responsibility to manage near-term and long-term risk. What you are trying to do is mitigate or minimize the overall risks in your situation.

And so in terms of, as General Odierno said, we have got a lot of stress on the force right now. Somebody has to speak up and say, well, we are going to have even more stress on the force down the road if we don't do certain things now to prepare.

And so you mentioned a particular exercise about forcible entry. Well, you know, a big part of the issue of anti-access/aerial denial is, you know, missile forces holding at-risk assets to forward bases, ships being vulnerable in the littoral.

I will just give you a quick example. There was one large exercise that Joint Forces Command did conduct in 2002. It was called Millennium Challenge 2002. And in that exercise, the enemy was a country similar to Iran.

And we found that, number one, operating our fleet in the Persian Gulf was a high-risk operation. A significant part of the fleet was either damaged or destroyed.

Number two, at the time the Army had a concept where it said we need to deploy a brigade forward in 96 hours, well, we got the brigade forward, but then how do you sustain it forward? That was an issue that developed.

Third was the enemy in this case decided to operate like the Serbians and not turn on their radars like they didn't do in 1999, so we were restricted to operating with our stealth aircraft. And the solution to that was to tell these guys to turn their radars back on.

So there were a number of lessons that came out of that, that said, look, toward the end of even the 2000-aughts, if you are thinking about projecting power in the Persian Gulf, even against a minor adversary, given the geography, you are going to confront a number of different problems.

And, in my estimation, that exercise was a success because, you know, it identified areas where we were doing well and areas where we needed to think about in terms of how we need to operate in the future.

Unfortunately, those lessons, I think, were left on the cutting room floor. I am not quite sure why, but you can begin to see now—I mean, Congresswoman Bordallo, you know, Guam, Andersen, we are piling stuff into Guam. You know, somebody said it is going to flip over one of these days, there is so much military capability—I know, I know.

But the point is, this isn't lost on the Chinese. And if you look at the ballistic missiles they are building, the greater and greater percentage of them are longer and longer range.

I mean, Guam and Andersen have a gigantic crosshairs on them right now. Well, what are we going to do about that? Are we just going to pile targets into Andersen so that the Chinese can intimi-

date us when they conduct, you know, some kind of military cooperation or coercion in the western Pacific?

We have got ships in the fleet that, you know, may be able to operate in the western Pacific, but you know, they have fairly shallow magazines. Well, we can't re-arm them at sea. And if they have got to come back to Guam for re-arming, then they are coming right into the bull's eye.

Okay, so what is the solution here? You know, back in the early 1990s, you know, studies in the office of the Secretary of Defense identified this as a problem. I have quotes from General Fogleman and Admiral Johnson, the Service chiefs of the Air Force and the Navy, in the mid-1990s saying this is a problem.

And here we are 2011, and the Air Force and the Navy are still trying to come up with an air-sea battle concept independent of what Joint Forces Command has done to try and begin to focus on this problem. You know, we are doing a very poor job of anticipating. And I agree with General Odierno; there are certain things you just can't know, and you are always going to be surprised to some extent. But you shouldn't be surprised by things like this.

Mr. GIBSON. Mr. Chairman, if I could just wrap up from that, I would just like to make one other comment, please.

Mr. FORBES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks very much.

Precisely the point I am hoping to make here in this hearing is that as we complete operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and as we look beyond COIN [counterinsurgency] being really our major focus, that we need to be brutally honest with ourselves in terms of our capability right now to conduct joint forceable entry, lead to early arriving forces, to campaign forces, to sustaining those forces, ultimately to bring victory in what would be probably a low-probability but very high-risk scenario right now. And this has everything to do with connectivity between how we communicate and how our diplomatic efforts go forward.

I want to be clear: In a perfect world, we will never have to do that. But I think to the extent that we show a capability, if we show a very competent capability to do that, I think that is going to help our country in the out-years.

Thanks.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Gibson.

The gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Griffin, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, I have been in the Reserve for Army Reserve for about 15 years, and I was wondering if you would speak to the Reserve Component and Guard and how important, if at all, joint training is in that context.

I know that for me personally, joint is something you learn about when you get deployed to theater, and I am sure, I know there have been attempts to address that and sort of change that. But we all know that there are limited resources. There is limited time for reservists, particularly the Guard.

And I wonder if you would just comment on that and what you all are doing to address that in that context?

General ODIERNO. There are a couple of things that we do.

First off, the way we do operations today is the Guard and the Reserves play a critical role, whether it be Iraq, Afghanistan, Japan, even some of the standing Joint Task Force we have prepared for response to a natural—a problem inside of the United States.

So we now have Joint Standing Task Forces that are made up of National Guard and Reserve component. So they are critical to that. They participate in all of the Joint Staffs and combined staffs that we have established for all of the exercises we do, I mean, all of the operational missions that we are doing, and they also play a role in all of the exercises that we do.

We also have in our Joint Warfighting Center, we have reservists and National Guard there who help us to train and sustain this, and that will remain. We have also developed both individual and collective training online that will remain as well in the deputy director J7 that will have access to the whole force to include our Joint Force.

So we have the pieces there, it is still about getting individuals, leaders and others to take advantage of this. It is also about making sure we don't forget about the Reserve component and Guard as we move forward. And I think we have worked very hard at this as we have gone forward in many of the operations and training environments that we have established.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Are a lot of these individuals, Guard and Reserve folks, are they AGR [Active Guard Reserve]? Are they full-time AGR?

General ODIERNO. It is a combination of all.

Mr. GRIFFIN. TPU [Troop Program Unit] and others.

General ODIERNO. It is a combination. Some are full time, but we also have many AGR and National Guard who come in on a periodic basis.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I am less concerned about you plugging people into your structure, because that is going to be a limited percentage of the Guard and Reserve force.

What I am more concerned about is just culturally incorporating the Guard and Reserve into what is going on with the Active Duty. I know that there are joint exercises occasionally, but in my real world experience, and I am still in a TPU—I am in the process of getting out of it because I have to—but in my experience, jointness is something that a lot of reservists and Guard members on a weekend basis just don't have any dealings with.

General ODIERNO. I will say that I have also, we have had some problems with National Guard and Reserve Component general officers who have not had the opportunity to serve in joint assignments. And we are trying to address that now and trying to identify them, recognize what they are doing and how we can better incorporate them. So I will tell you it is not a full solution that we have developed.

Mr. GRIFFIN. It is a challenge.

General ODIERNO. It is a challenge.

And it is also about making sure that we have the leadership of the National Guard, which they do, and Reserve Component of all the Services understanding the importance of ensuring they do get

involved in the joint culture, because it is something that we all are totally involved with.

We don't do many large-scale exercises anymore that are not joint. We do very few Service-only exercises.

And so it is important that we integrate that because the Guard and the Reserves are going to be such an important part of our operational capability as we move forward.

Mr. GRIFFIN. As we move away from the strategic concept.

General ODIERNO. That is right.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Admiral, do you have anything to add in my 21 seconds I have left?

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. One of our key take-aways, when it comes to employing the Guard and Reserve, we don't want to go back to where we were 10 years ago. And as we are looking to the future, it is, how are we going to employ the Guard and Reserve? How can we take those units? How can we train them and employ them, whether they are in exercises, some rotational capacity. And in order to do that, there has got to be training on the front end of that, and that is where we are going to have to focus that joint training.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, all. I appreciate it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Griffin.

We appreciate all three of you being here today. I have got just a couple of questions. We will come back, Madeleine, if that is okay.

One of the frustrating points that we have as Members of Congress, and I don't expect you to comment on this, is that we feel over and over again today, from the Department, that we are not getting true risk assessments, true strategic analysis, because it is being so budget driven, that it is more budget driven than it is by risk assessment.

That may be true. It may be false. But it is not just us. The independent panel that was as partisan as you can get—no one thought they would reach consensus—they reached a consensus that that is what they thought, that the QDR even was now being budget driven, as opposed to being driven by risk assessments.

We have to do the best we can to pull our way through that. And we get wonderful men like you who come over to testify to us, but we know when you walk through those doors, your hands aren't physically tied behind you, but your testimony is, because you have to salute and you have to take what is given to you.

And I don't say that critically; I am just saying we understand that. We don't expect you to do different.

But our job here is to try to filter through that the best we can and get the answers we need because, in the final analysis, the job that Ms. Bordallo and I have is to make sure, when we have a fight anywhere in the world, we don't point fingers but that our men and women are ready for that fight.

Doctor, you talked about Millennium Challenge, but you didn't really get the clear picture, I don't think, of why we left some of those concepts on the floor.

You know, you pointed out to me in conversations before, three examples, Admiral Yarnell and I think his war game, and the Panzer situation in Germany.

And we have a difficult situation, I think, some time, because we love to reinforce what we have done as opposed to learn the lessons to predict where we are coming. And I am going to ask you if you can just to elaborate a little bit on your thought and any potential concerns you have about our inability to continue to look at the experimentation and what we need to be learning from lessons learned and some of the institutional concerns that prohibit us from learning those lessons.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Well, specifically, in terms of Joint Forces Command, again, one of the motivating factors behind its creation was to have someone, four-star commander with sufficient clout, so that the results of these exercises and experiments would get a hearing in terms of establishing requirements, that there would be an interest on the part of the senior defense leadership back in the Pentagon on the results and on, you know, what the consequences were and how they might be applied to the defense program and forces and such.

There was discussion at the time about giving MFP [major force program] authority to Joint Forces Command. For some reason, several Joint Forces Command commanders rejected that, but again, that would have given them the opportunity, when you are looking at some of these emerging challenges, to say that if we could prototype this capability, would it make a big difference or wouldn't it? And again, we see prototyping being an important factor in the past in militaries getting a sense of what they need to be able to do next.

The fact that the commander of Joint Forces Command didn't have a seat on the JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council], didn't have a seat on the Defense Acquisition Board, again, really no voice in terms of making recommendations that they could really, perhaps, stick in terms of requirements and, you know, program choices and so on.

The fact that there was turnover, you know, the commanders typically lasted 2 or 3 years. My sense was that if you got somebody who is really capable, two 3-year tours followed by a third tour as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, because when you are talking about changes in doctrine, you are talking about new kinds of capabilities and systems. It is not a 2-year or 3-year problem you have to solve, it is an 8- or a 9- or a 10-year problem.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. So I think those are some of the things. And then again, the Services, they, according to Title 10, they are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping the force. And they guard that prerogative jealously. You know, that is their responsibility. They feel like they have the level of expertise inherent in their organization to be able to make the best decisions about ground forces, Air Forces, Naval forces, and so on. And I think they are reluctant to, quite frankly, put a lot of trust in one command that will not only see things the way they do but see things in the right way. You know, why is your view better than mine?

So there are a number of reasons I think, you know, why there is difficulty in getting this done. And I also mentioned in the testi-

mony that oftentimes field exercises can be a big help because they can show you what is possible. I mentioned Admiral Pratt after Fleet Problem IX, you know, moving his flag from a battleship to a carrier because he was so impressed by what a carrier could do. General Halder, after the '37 field exercises in Germany, just was amazed at, not the theory, but actually what he could see happening and the reality of that. And it is not just the senior leaders. It is officers at a number of different levels that generate a momentum for this kind of change where it wouldn't exist. It is hard to get people excited about a war game or a simulation. It is much easier to get people excited when they can actually see it happening in reality.

So I think that is another particular issue when you are thinking about this particular role for Joint Forces Command. General Odierno said, you know, obviously, we haven't seen anything like Millennium Challenge since Millennium Challenge. Understandably, you have wars on several fronts, tightening budgets. But at the same time, I think if you look at the American military's history and experience, in the 1930s, we were doing these things with the fleet problem and so on; we were in the middle of a depression when we did those things. The United States Army in the late 1950s and early 1960s, at the height of the Cold War, stood down an entire division to develop the air mobile/air assault concept. In the early 1970s, they did it with the TRICAP [triple capability] Division. In 1980s, they did it with the High Technology Test Bed Division. So they were willing to take risks in the short term in order to minimize risks in the long term. I think that approach is important.

And the final thing I will say is we don't seem to do strategy very well. I think there was kind of an allusion to that in the critique of the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review]. If you don't do strategy, if you don't take it seriously, and strategy involves looking down the road as well as what you have got in front of you today, then everything that comes up seems to be priority number one, because you really haven't done that risk analysis to where you are balancing in the near-term and the long-term risk. I would say it is not just a military problem. My understanding is it is quite characteristic not only of this Administration but the previous Administration.

Mr. FORBES. Or Administrations. Let me read you a quote from some military papers. It says this: The building of joint operations systems, jointness, is the focal point of modernization and preparations for military struggle. Do either of the three of you agree with that statement or disagree with that statement?

If you need me to, let me read it again: The building of operations systems is the focal point of modernization and preparations for military struggle.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I will take the first crack at it, I guess. I think what that quote says to me is there are some major strategic choices out there, you know, getting back to the point of strategy. Anti-access/area denial. Are we going to counterbalance China in the Western Pacific or aren't we? What is it going to take to do it? Is that possible technologically? Is it possible fiscally for us to do that? Is it possible if we get some help from our allies? What is it

going to take? Or if we can't do it, then that is something the commander in chief needs to know so he can adapt our overall grand strategy to take that into account.

The diffusion of guided weapons into the hands of irregular forces, that is coming. You know, what will a third Lebanon war look like if Hezbollah has out of its 4,000 projectiles that it might fire into Israel as it did in the last war maybe 1,000 that are guided? Space: Are we going to continue to pack stuff into low Earth orbit, or are we going to emphasize more mission-type orders, commanders' intent, terrestrial-based alternative systems? We don't know. But we know we can't invest the same dollar twice.

And so there are a number of strategic choices that are in front of us. And the importance of what Joint Forces Command in this area was designed to do was to help us get some of those answers, because you know, only they could bring together a Joint Force; only they could ideally do an impartial analysis and provide good input into decisionmakers who are making decisions about strategy and programs and budgets.

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, what is your take on that phrase?

Admiral GORTNEY. I have a little bit more water in my glass. I don't disagree with any of the challenges, and I agree with almost all of the challenges that the doctor brought out.

But at the end of the day, I think we are doing better than most people think we do. And I think we are doing as well as our predecessors did, given the challenges and constraints and restraints that they were confronted with.

When it comes to joint training, after 10 years of combat, everybody has found out pretty closely that there is no team sport like combat. And the Joint Force, no Service can go alone; no platoon, no ship, no squadron can do it alone. It is the synergy of the Joint Force bringing tasks to bear to create the effect that we want to effect on the battlefield. And I think we are doing pretty good work with that. And it is because our predecessors gave us that capability, and our leaders had the vision of Goldwater-Nichols to force us to do it, because the Services wouldn't have done it on their own, clearly.

So what are some of the challenges, though, of that weapons system?

Mr. FORBES. And Admiral, I am going to let you come back to that. Could we focus just on this statement, if you would? Because this statement basically is saying that jointness is a focal point of modernization and preparations for military struggle. And I want you to say all you want to say. I am going to give you plenty of time to do that. But do you agree with that statement or disagree with that statement?

Admiral GORTNEY. No, sir, I agree with it. And that is how I opened it up. Jointness is the philosophy that underpins the United States strategic and operational applications of the military. That is how I opened up my—

Mr. FORBES. I appreciate that.

And General.

General ODIERNO. I do agree with it.

Mr. FORBES. Okay.

And the reason that I asked that—it is not a trick question—is that statement is coming from the most recent PLA [People's Liberation Army] defense white paper that they put out. So they recognize that.

Here is the confusion that I have, not from any of the three of you. But when the Secretary announced the closure of Joint Forces Command, he didn't do it in a venue of saying we want to do jointness and keep it as a priority. He did it in a venue of saying we have got to make significant cuts to the military, \$100 billion of cuts basically at the time. And here is one of the big cuts that we are going to do because we are going to save money.

Most of us realize, when you start saying you are going to do something better and you are going to save money, oftentimes that comes back to bite you. You get what you pay for. So, when the Secretary came out and said, we can now cut this because we are there, help me with what your best understanding is. Was he saying that we have got to make some cost cuts and we are going to do this, or was he saying we have done the analysis and we think we can do jointness better because it is still going to be a priority for us? Or was he saying we have already accomplished this now and we don't need to put that kind of focus on it?

General ODIERNO. I am not going to try read the mind of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. FORBES. No.

General ODIERNO. But what I am going to tell you is the conversations I have had with him and where we are now going. What I think his point was is that we have made progress in jointness. We are much better at it today than we were 10, 15 years ago. And we believe, he believes, and I believe it is no longer necessary to have a four-star command to oversee the process of jointness.

But I would also say what we found is what had happened to Joint Forces Command over the 10 years is there is many things that were attached to it, added to it that has absolutely nothing to do with meeting our core mission of sustaining jointness. And so I think the solution we came to is that we need to eliminate those things that are redundant and done other places, those things that don't really apply to us sustaining our jointness in the future, and let's create something that is more efficient but still enables us to focus on this very important task of jointness, understanding that we have made progress over the last 10 years.

Mr. FORBES. And General, if you would, I think a lot of those additional things were sent down from the Department of Defense to Joint Forces Command. They didn't birth from the Joint Forces Command. They were sent down from the top, saying, will you do this? The second thing, though, that concerns me is when we say we no longer need a four-star general to push these concepts and what they are doing, one of the real concerns I have is with the experimentation and what we are doing there.

And you and I had a conversation just this morning, and I really respect and appreciate what you said, and I hope it is okay to repeat it, in that you pushed strongly for the continuation of that experimentation component because you thought it was valuable. Fair statement?

General ODIERNO. Absolutely fair.

Mr. FORBES. And secondly, that you had to push hard for it because you got some push back.

General ODIERNO. There were some elements who didn't agree with it. It was not the Secretary.

Mr. FORBES. No, no, no, this is not a pointing the finger at the Secretary. This is just saying you got some push back. I think the doctor would say that what you did was very important, that we keep experimentation.

Here is my worry. You are a big guy in a lot of ways, you know, not just the stars on your shoulders, but you carry a lot of clout with you, and you had to push hard for that concept. If we had someone that didn't have that kind of clout, I don't know if that day would have been won or not. And I don't know tomorrow, if we don't have somebody in there with that kind of clout pushing it, I don't know whether that day—let me just if I can, and then I am going to give you a chance.

The independent panel that came back, not on Joint Forces Command, but on the QDR, basically said exactly that. They said that what happens is now, instead of doing these looks at what we need to do, what we are doing is using it to justify what we are already doing. And that is just the natural bureaucratic tendency to have happen. How are we going to be assured that that is not going to happen with the whole jointness concept? Because clearly, the message the Secretary gave in his opening volley was, oh, we have kind of reached this point now, and all we have to do is make sure we don't slide back, but we don't have to keep pushing forward.

General ODIERNO. First, what I would say is with the way we have set this up for the future is that we now have a three-star J7, which in the past it has been a one-star general, who will focus his full time and effort on overseeing this effort for the chairman and the vice chairman. And what you are really doing is, in my opinion, cutting a level of command that allows this issue to be raised much more quickly and, when there is an issue, be brought directly to the chairman and the vice chairman, who ultimately has the responsibility by Title 10 for jointness.

One of the struggles I see, although I have not had to live it because my time as Joint Forces Command has been different than others, is that he really has very few authorities. The authorities rest with the chairman and the vice chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on making decisions that are key to sustaining jointness over time.

What the Joint Forces Command commander was able to do was raise some issues, bring attention to it. And I think that is the point you are making.

But I would argue today, because of where we come and because in fact we are going to raise the level of expertise on the Joint Staff on this, I think it will actually streamline it. And I think it forces the chairman and the vice chairman to make sure they are overseeing this.

And as we talked, and I will say it now, is, as we walk through this, the chairman, we all agree that in a year, we will do an analysis of this. And we will continue to do this to make sure we got it right. Because we think it is so important that we are able to sustain our ability to move forward with jointness.

Mr. FORBES. Would you mind if I just asked a couple more questions on that, General? Oh, I will come right back to him. The concern that you said you thought it was important that we do an analysis in a year or so to make sure we had made the right decisions because it was so important on the jointness issue. And I think, but I just wanted to make sure that I was correct, you said that you have done an analysis of that yourself at this particular point in time and think we are moving in the right direction. And I think when I asked you on that, too, you said that analysis was—because I used the concern of what happens if somebody kidnaps you or takes you away, and you said that this would all obviously be done in a written format and that analysis. And I take it when the chairman has this done down the road, the same thing would take place. It would be a written analysis because it was so important to do. Fair?

General ODIERNO. Yeah. I can't speak for what the chairman will do, but what I can tell you is we will provide, we are providing a written analysis of how we came to our conclusion.

Mr. FORBES. But the analysis that should be done in a year will be similar?

General ODIERNO. We will use that as a baseline.

Mr. FORBES. And the admiral is shaking his head yes.

Then help me with this. If it is so important, and I agree with you, and that that analysis needed to be done by you and that analysis to be done, why wasn't it important that the Secretary do that same kind of analysis before he announced the disestablishment, or as he said at first, the closure of the Joint Forces Command? And the reason I raise it is this, because I think you can appreciate how it does not give quite the same credibility when you come out and say, by the Secretary of Defense, we are going to do this, and then say, you are tasked to do it, and then come back and give us the analysis that we are doing the right thing.

It would have been far more credible for us as a Congress had the Secretary come in and said, let's do an analysis and see if that is the right decision to do first so that everybody could have analyzed that and looked at that same kind of analysis. Why wasn't that kind of analysis done before the decision was made?

General ODIERNO. I can't say it wasn't. What I know is I got a guidance letter based on analysis that was given to Joint Forces Command before I got there. So we took the guidance letter that we got from the Office of Secretary of Defense on what they wanted us to look at, and then we did our own independent analysis based on the guidance letter we received. So I can't discuss about what analysis was done prior.

Mr. FORBES. I am not asking you. The only thing I would ask is this. And you have been very patient with me. But oftentimes we see reports, we have just had some from the GAO [Government Accountability Office] and other groups that might analyze decisions we have made, whether it is moving carriers or whatever else, and sometimes they disagree by hundreds of billions of dollars. If I am doing an analysis, it would seem to me to make sense that one of the things I would want to do is look at the previous analysis that was done and compare my analysis with that and say, did we line up, or how far off we were.

My question to you is, not just a guidance letter, but were you ever presented with the written analysis that was done to substantiate the decision to shut down the Joint Forces Command initially?

General ODIERNO. My thought was—my impression was that they wanted my independent military opinion based on independent analysis to come forward. And that is what I did.

Mr. FORBES. And General, the last thing I guess I will ask you is this. When you were sent down to the Joint Forces Command, were your instructions to go down and make an independent analysis and come back and tell us what we should do, or was it to disestablish the Joint Forces Command?

General ODIERNO. I was required to report back to the Secretary on my findings of the analysis on what I thought we should do.

Mr. FORBES. To shut down the Joint Forces Command.

General ODIERNO. To take a look at the guidance I had been given, which was based on the announcement that the Secretary did, was to disestablish Joint Forces Command. And he asked me to do an independent analysis. We did that. We presented that back to the Secretary.

Mr. FORBES. But General, again, your instructions, as I understood them, and you correct me if I am wrong, was not to come back and do an independent analysis and let us know what we should do. It was to say how best to shut down and disestablish the Joint Forces Command.

General ODIERNO. I would say that is correct.

Mr. FORBES. Okay. And the only thing I throw back to you is you understand how that is less credible to us than if the Secretary had said to a very respected general such as yourself, go down there and do an independent analysis and come down and tell us what decision we should make.

And the final thing I will just say, General, is to this date, if that analysis exists prior to August 9, when the Secretary made it, he has refused to give it to any Member of Congress that I have seen from this committee, the Budget Committee, the Oversight Committee, or the Senate, or anything else. And that I think is a huge concern of ours.

But thank you for that.

Admiral, one quick question for you. When we did BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment] stuff on here, this committee also has jurisdiction over MILCON [military construction] projects, when we do a MILCON project—my good friend has overseen a lot of those in Guam now—there is kind of a start and there is a stop. And at some particular point, we walk in and say this building is done, and it is completed. How is jointness, and how is education? Because you mentioned to me both yesterday and today, you said all our young men and women know is jointness, because that is what they have been trained to do. But it would seem to me that jointness is never something that we just get done and say, we are done. It seems like it is constantly being trained, and taught, and built, and reexamined, and looked at, and it is an evolving, dynamic thing. Is it more like the MILCON project or more like that education thing that is an ongoing process?

Admiral GORTNEY. It is a continuum of education, sir, as are most things. And we have put process in place. We have legislated education requirements and experience requirements that service members must achieve in order to promote. And we reinforce that through a reporting process. Out of every statutory board, promotion board, the Secretary—the chairman has to sign to the Secretary joint qualifications, joint educational requirements, things of that nature that mandates that it continues.

Mr. FORBES. And you guys do a wonderful job. You train our young men and women better than any in the world. But you start fresh with every young man and woman that comes and raises their hands and are sworn in.

And my big concern here is this. I am not expecting you guys to weigh in on it. But I fear when I hear the Secretary say we have reached jointness and now we just have to keep from backsliding, that we forget that jointness is that component of rebuilding that, retraining that to every single one of those recruits and also, like the doctor mentioned, constantly looking at a dynamic, evolving world and how we are going to do the jointness for our allies and for us.

And Doctor, I know you had a comment earlier. And thanks for your patience with me.

And I will let you do that and then go back to Ms. Bordallo.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I think at least in terms of the purpose for which Joint Forces Command was established as separate from Atlantic Command, I think it was pretty clear. I don't know that you would really need a rigorous, detailed analysis to know that that mission was not being accomplished, the joint concept development and exercises, to the point where you could say we need to continue to justify this as a command. Plus you had the fact that Atlantic Command had a geographic responsibility. Joint Forces Command no longer had one. Nor was the Joint Forces Command commander the Supreme Commander for Allied Command Transformations. So I think that is one aspect of it. I mean having sort of tracked the command since its inception, I don't think it is a hard case to make that in terms of accomplishing that mission after 12 years, this wasn't working. Now, I think we need to find something that works. But clearly, it seemed to me that what we had was not working.

In terms of General Odierno talked about pushback and so on, there has been a lot of pushback over time because a lot of the things the Joint Forces Command was coming up with weren't seen as particularly relevant. And when I talked to one of the commanders a few years ago, the issue came up, we are looking 20 to 30 years out. And I said in a way, you are kind of wasting your time. Nobody has a clue what is going to happen 20 or 30 years from now. I said, if you look back historically, and I was part of the National Defense Panel conversations course, you are looking 5 to 8, maybe 10 years out. And that is what you are really focused on. And in a sense, some of these problems are problems that we know of today that are just going to get worse over time. So, of course, if that is what you think your mission is and that is what you are providing by way of results, you are not going to satisfy very many people.

The concepts they were coming up with were interesting but very abstract. And actually, the impetus for them was a memo signed out by Secretary Rumsfeld in August of 2002 that said we need joint integrating and operating concepts to deal with these problems that he had identified in the 2001 QDR, which were not terribly different from the ones that I mentioned here. And unfortunately, in talking to a number of senior military leaders, they just did not feel that they were useful to them. So I think that created a problem.

Now, do we have a solution? I don't know. I would say that I would rather be a combatant commander than a three-star J7. I think they have more clout. I think they have more influence. I think they have more access. I could be wrong.

I do know that, in 1999, when Secretary Cohen and General Shelton were approached by Members of Congress about establishing a Joint Forces Command because they took the National Defense Panel report, they did say that periodically we would revisit the command and see how well it is doing and make adaptations so that at least that is on the table.

My sense is I think that if you look at what the command has done well, in a sense there is kind of three missions: One is what some of us in the military in the past have called polishing the cannonball; you know, to get more efficient at what you are already doing. And I think, based on my experience, I think the command has done that pretty darn well.

Second is reactive transformation. You know, if the mission was transformation, I think as General Odierno said, and he should know better than just about anybody, the command provided a significant amount of utility when we were faced with modern insurgency or irregular warfare in terms of helping us begin to deal with that, react to that, and become very proficient at it.

I think the area where we have consistently come up short is what I would call anticipatory transformation, getting out in front of the next problem. And I don't see necessarily how that is going to change, given what we have here in terms of the disestablishment of Joint Forces Command. It is not self-evident to me that what we have got in its place is going to accomplish that mission.

Mr. FORBES. Okay.

Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And my first question is for you, Dr. Krepinevich. I want to thank you for mentioning Guam. And just to let you know, and the rest of the world, that we are still afloat.

To be clear, Doctor, China does not have a missile that can reach Guam yet, although it has been talked about. Is that correct?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I am not sure about the specific ranges. And of course, a number of those are classified in terms of what we get from our intelligence community.

I do know that beginning in the mid-1990s, they focused intently in building missiles that could range Taiwan. And then, in my conversations with my Japanese colleagues in recent years, they said, well, they have moved beyond that; they have really begun to em-

phasize hitting us now with medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

I have had classified briefings that would suggest that the overall trend, I think I can say this, is toward increasing range, number one. It has been reported in the open literature that they are developing the DF-21, which is designed to be a maneuverable warhead to go after our carriers. And then, of course, you have the issue of their submarine fleet, which although it, in terms of technical capacity, isn't that great, you know, the potential for anti-ship cruise missiles and cruise missiles that could be used, especially if you get to shoot first in a conflict, you can at least expend those munitions. And then building certain capacity in terms of their air force and so on.

So I would say that depending upon the contingency you are looking at right now, we are lesser or better able to prepare to deal with it. Based upon my understanding of what is in the open literature, open source literature right now, obviously the Taiwan situation is not as—we don't have as—it is a higher risk proposition.

Ms. BORDALLO. Right.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. If you look at the way—if you look at two things, if you look at where we are basing our forces in Kadena and in Anderson, when I was a kid, I would watch these Westerns. And there was always some second lieutenant leading the wagon train, usually Ricky Nelson or Fabian or somebody, who wanted to take them through the canyon. And somebody like John Wayne would say, don't do it, that is where all the Indians are. In a sense, these big bases are the canyons. If they know you have got to go through there, if they know that is where you are going to be, you have given them an incredible incentive to target those. So, again, we see the Chinese moving exactly in that direction.

In terms of investments, and I was very glad to see Secretary Gates make the announcement recently that they are going to move forward with the family of long-range strike systems, because up until now our investment ratio has been over 15 to 1 short range versus long range.

Ms. BORDALLO. That was one of the things, Doctor, I was going to talk to you, because further, when we talk anti-access, shouldn't we view this through a prism of full-spectrum operations like the long-range strike?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Absolutely. Our center has developed our version of the air-sea battle concept. And since right now it is the only game in town, we have gotten a lot of visits both from the Chinese embassy and the Japanese embassy. And I was scheduled to meet with the chief of staff of the Japanese Air Force. Unfortunately, the earthquake precluded that.

But the idea behind that is you have an integrated set of capabilities. And again, this is why exercises at the tactical level and training at the tactical level make sense. But unless you put it within an overall operational context of what you are trying to do as part of a campaign, you know, you really are not capturing all you need to do.

And so, for example, in our concept, we realized that, at least the way we look at the situation, number one, you know, things like range become very important; submarines become very important;

anti-satellite capability becomes very important; cyber. We were able to sit down with the Japanese and say, look, we need your vote in the U.N.; we need your bases, but here is what we need in terms of your military capability. And we actually ended up doing planning exercises with the Japanese Government. And they are waiting—they are waiting for our Air Force and our Navy to publish air-sea battle. And they have been waiting since Secretary Gates gave them the directive over a year ago.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Doctor.

Both the chairman and I have been through numerous briefings and CODELs [congressional delegations] over to China. And there is not much you can learn. They are very secretive. But I do know that they are developing missiles that—

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Well, if you read their military publications, they are—first of all, they are very unambiguous that way. There are slogans like, and this is repetitive, you know, we need capabilities that will enable the inferior to defeat the superior. We are weak, but we are not weak in all things. The Americans are strong, but they are not strong in all things. We need to align Eastern wisdom and Western technology to defeat the Americans.

If we were publishing stuff like this about the Chinese, there would be a great hoo-hah.

Ms. BORDALLO. There would probably be another war.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Quite frankly, the shift clearly is one to move the military balance in their favor. We used to have a term for it in the Cold War called Finlandization. You gradually shift the military balance to where your allies start to become detached from you because they lose confidence in you. And their big emphasis is on this anti-access/area denial capability and fracturing our battle networks.

So one big question, in fact General Mattis and I, the predecessor to General Odierno, used to have this conversation about, okay, what happens—are we training sufficiently enough and rigorously enough and at the operational level in situations where we lose access to the battle network? And General Odierno and I were commissioned around the same time. Obviously, he has gone a little bit further than I did, but one of the things that would happen in a lot of field exercises was the evaluator would come and say, buddy, you just loss your coms [communications]. And you would have to figure out, okay, well, how do I operate effectively now?

And those are the sorts of things that we need to be doing. And it is not just at the individual unit level; it is with a campaign perspective. And the talent is out there. And the frustration, at least for me individually, is why haven't we been able to harness this great talent, you know, the great professionalism of our military to begin to come up with at least some answers to these questions?

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Doctor.

I do have just one last question, Mr. Chairman, please bear with me, for the admiral, and possibly the general as well.

I have heard nearly every combatant commander come and testify that they are trying to build a whole-of-government approach to their operations in their areas of responsibility. And some have mentioned strategic endeavors to foster broader public-private partnerships between the military and commercial industries.

Now, my question for you is how does the Joint Staff foster this partnering ideology? And what is the Joint Staff doing to build broader inter-coordination among our forces around the world and our future allies or partners?

And I could, Admiral, start with you.

Admiral GORTNEY. If there is another lesson learned from 10 years of combat, it is the whole-of-government approach and how much it is needed. It is a key tenet of what we want to do, what we want to continue to do, what we want to continue to train to. And one of the synergies of aligning Joint Force Development underneath the J7 for the chairman is that the interagency lives here in D.C., the exercise. We can exercise here in D.C. We have the conferences here in Washington, D.C. It really provides that opportunity to ensure that we do it right in the future.

Ms. BORDALLO. General.

General ODIERNO. I don't want to go too long of an answer on this. But this is one that I think about and talk about quite often. We are watching it in front of our eyes today: The globalization, which is allowing many different communities to understand what is going on around the world very quickly, the change in populations, the change in power as we see it shifting in front of us requires us to engage along several different levels. We have learned over the last 10 years that sometimes there is a limit to military power, and you have to use many other capabilities in order to achieve your end states and your results.

And I think what the combatant commanders are talking about is they must have the capabilities to go out there many different ways in coordination with our interagency partners, as well as make bilateral connections, mil-to-mil connections with all these different countries around the world, for us to understand, better understand the environment that we have to operate in and how we might solve problems in many different ways, just not always with our military power but in conjunction with our capabilities within our military.

And I think that is one of the key components of our training of our young joint officers today is them understanding the environment around them and then able to think about these complex environments they are about ready to enter and how they can come up with the right solutions working across the broad spectrum.

And I think as we continue to have budget issues and budget problems and potential reductions and other things, we have to come up with adaptive alternative ways to solve problems. And I think that is why they believe they have to continue to do this.

So I think it is something we have to pay attention to. It is something we have to focus on as we move forward. You know, we talked about anti-access. You know, part of that is attacking that across many different ways, having a military capability to do it, but also, how do we gain access? You know, the global commons we used to always think of as air, land, and sea. It is now air, land, sea, space, I personally would add cyberspace. So how do we assure our own access to the global commons as we look forward around the world? And those are the issues that are very difficult. And that is why we have to attack it in many different new ways, ma'am.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I would say that the military buildup that is occurring right now on Guam, and of course, this is a partnership between Guam and Japan; this would be a shining example of how we are going to be able to go forward.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

Mr. FORBES. General, any final comments you have or questions that we didn't ask that you wanted to get on the record?

General ODIERNO. The only thing I would say is I want to again thank you for holding this hearing. I think it is a very important one. And the discussion we had is one that we have to constantly have as we look ahead to the future and how we are going to sustain ourselves in this very complex environment.

So I just want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this committee meeting today.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. And thank you for being here today.

Admiral, any final thoughts that you have?

Admiral GORTNEY. Yes, sir. I just want to make sure there is no doubt in anybody's mind that through this process, we are not challenging or walking away from Goldwater-Nichols and the importance of Joint Force development. Remember that Goldwater-Nichols predates JFCOM by 13 years. Instead, we are finding a better way to perform that joint oversight and ensuring joint readiness if the future.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral.

Doctor, any final comments?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Just to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to be here and express my views today, and also to have the opportunity to publicly express my admiration and appreciation for, in particular, General Odierno and his great service to our country, but also to the admiral and the little army that he brought along today. Having served in the military once upon a time myself, I can't but imagine how challenging and how difficult it has been for these young men and women, and how remarkable a job they have done under these difficult circumstances.

Thank you.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you all for being with us. We appreciate your patience and your service to the country. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

MARCH 31, 2011

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 31, 2011

Statement of Hon. J. Randy Forbes
Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness
Hearing on
Improving the Readiness of U.S. Forces
Through Military Jointness
March 31, 2011

I want to welcome all our members and our distinguished panel of experts to today's hearing that will focus on how we are progressing towards improvements in the readiness of our forces through military jointness. This topic is particularly relevant with the pending closure of the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). Ironically the impetus for JFCOM was that landmark legislation on jointness, Goldwater-Nichols.

Let me first take a step back in history. In a special message to Congress in 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower stated that "Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all Services, as one single, concentrated effort." However, President Eisenhower's vision was not fully realized until the passage of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986.

The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that the U.S. military indeed has made significant gains in joint operations, training and doctrine. However, there are still areas impacting the readiness of our forces that need to be addressed. We still must develop jointness in the way we communicate, procure our weapon systems, and in our logistics processes and information systems. That once would have been the *ongoing* role of JFCOM.

In announcing the closure of JFCOM, Secretary Gates said the "U.S. military has largely embraced jointness as a matter of culture and practice, although we must always remain vigilant against backsliding on this front."

In reality, it is my contention that we cannot simply focus on what we have achieved to date and try to avoid a "backslide." But rather we must continue to advance joint concepts in terms of doctrine, training and development of strategies and tactics since each scenario we face in the future will call for joint operations, but potentially differing responses. For example, the growing military power of China and its potential threat to the Asia-Pacific region would call for a different joint response from U.S. military forces, possibly more focused on an air-sea operation, than the current CENTCOM operations, which primarily are land-based.

I would ask our witnesses their views on how we can be assured this forward look at jointness will happen without a body that has

the authority to “force” that on the Services? The Joint Staff has played the role of principal military “advisor” to our senior civilian leadership. Even if they develop the necessary concepts to further jointness, how will they be able to press the Services into compliance?

In a recent speech at the Air Force Academy, Secretary Gates said, “It’s easier to be joint and talk joint when there’s money to go around and a war to be won.” He said, “It’s much harder to do when tough choices have to be made within and between the military Services—between what is ideal from a particular Service perspective, and what will get the job done, taking into account broader priorities and considerations.” I agree with Secretary Gates in this regard. Resistant bureaucracies exist within every part of the Executive Branch, and the Service departments within the Pentagon are no different.

Another critical readiness factor, is that of the role of joint force provider. Jointness dictates that the Services operate within their core competencies and seek the expertise of the Service whose skills lie in a particular competency, including training. In the new construct, it is unclear who will take on this responsibility, but in order to truly promote jointness, it cannot be given to one particular military Service.

Finally, the operations with our NATO allies pose another concern—an example of their importance to our security interests is being reinforced even as we sit here, with the operations over Libya, which the committee heard about this morning.

JFCOM provided several venues in which U.S. and allied forces could interact. That dynamic cannot help but change. Indeed, French Air Force Gen. Stephane Abrial, supreme allied commander for transformation, in discussing the NATO role after the closure of JFCOM, told reporters that ACT has started looking at “how we will re-plug into this much more distributed system.”

Joining us today to discuss these issues are three distinguished individuals:

- General Raymond Odierno, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command. General Odierno most recently served as commanding general for the Multi-National Force—Iraq, working jointly with our allies. He also has served in other senior joint positions in the Pentagon. These assignments have more than prepared him for ensuring that the military’s focus remains on jointness even as JFCOM is disestablished.
- Vice Admiral William E. Gortney, Director, Joint Staff. While primarily serving in senior Navy commands throughout his career, Admiral Gortney has stated that Goldwater-Nichols substantially helped his career. Now as director of the joint staff Admiral Gortney is uniquely positioned to reinforce his personal commitment to jointness.
- Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, President, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Dr. Krepinevich is a well-known military expert and currently serves on the Joint Forces Command’s Transformation Advisory Board. He has been involved with JFCOM since its beginning.

Gentlemen, thank you all for being here.

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STATEMENT OF

**GENERAL RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, U.S. ARMY
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND**

**IMPROVING THE READINESS OF U.S. FORCES
THROUGH MILITARY JOINTNESS**

HASC READINESS SUBCOMMITTEE

MARCH 31, 2011

Statement of

**General Raymond T. Odierno, U.S. Army
Commander, United States Joint Forces Command**

Before the House Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee

March 31, 2011

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to describe how we will preserve the current gains and momentum in jointness, maintain joint readiness, and develop the future joint force given the decision to disestablish US Joint Forces Command.

On 9 August 2010, the Secretary of Defense announced a recommendation to disestablish US Joint Forces Command. Using the Secretary's initial guidance, US Joint Forces Command collaborated with the Joint Staff to prepare a proposal to disestablish the four-star headquarters, eliminate redundant or unnecessary functions, and transfer unique joint capabilities to other DoD entities in order to preserve joint readiness. This proposal was part of a broader effort to make the defense enterprise a more cost conscious, efficient, and effective organization. The Secretary of Defense's recommendation to disestablish US Joint Forces Command was approved by the President on 6 January 2011 and the overarching plan to disestablish U.S. Joint Forces Command was subsequently approved by the Secretary of Defense on 9 February 2011.

We have made significant strides in developing the joint force since the Department entered a new era just over ten years ago and established a separate four-star command, US Joint Forces Command, to advocate and infuse jointness into a variety of Department activities. The Services have made remarkable gains in terms of executing joint operations at varying levels of intensity, and of employing complementary capabilities in the battle space. We have codified joint training, planning,

and execution in policy documents and doctrine and have years of combat experience that validate the way we execute joint operations. Based on my best military judgment I believe it is the right time to disestablish US Joint Forces Command and I fully support the Secretary of Defense's decision to do so. As we move forward I will provide you with details on how I intend to implement the plan to preserve the momentum the Department has gained in joint operations, maintain joint readiness in the future, and ensure the joint force continues to develop new and relevant capabilities for the future operating environment.

In its initial state, US Joint Forces Command was comprised of nine functional organizations plus a headquarters focused on three critical functions – joint force provider, joint trainer, and joint integrator. At the time, the commander of US Joint Forces Command was dual-hatted as a NATO commander, initially for Supreme Allied Command Atlantic and then for Supreme Allied Command Transformation. Over the years, in addition to its NATO role, US Joint Forces Command acquired responsibility and resources for 18 additional functional missions, with multiple resources sponsors. Some of these additions, such as experimentation, were complementary to the Command's original charter. Others were unique joint capabilities added so that US Joint Forces Command could provide leadership, advocacy and oversight. As the responsibilities for joint operational improvements and activities fell to US Joint Forces Command, the Command's joint task workload continued to grow with a four-fold increase in budget from the original \$200M budget to approximately \$900M. Each directorate, command and activity contributed to improving the joint force in their own way. However, the overall organizational structure as a whole was never optimized to maximize organizational agility and operational responsiveness in order to generate enhanced joint operational capability.

Working in close coordination with the Joint Staff, we applied detailed analysis to assess the functional construct of US Joint Forces Command and tighten focus on core joint capabilities. Informed by that analysis I offered my best military judgment to innovatively satisfy our part of the broader efficiencies initiative.

Underlying this analysis are my experiences as a joint force commander in Iraq. We have seized a rare opportunity to capitalize on the achievements and momentum we have made inculcating jointness throughout the force, and provide more efficient and effective support to the joint warfighter. When US Joint Forces Command was established, we did not enjoy the advantage of this momentum, therefore the Chairman needed a dedicated four star command to lead the effort. The steady advance of the joint force however, allows us to leverage the expertise of other combatant commands, the Services and some agencies to take up the mantle of the unique and necessary joint capabilities in the US Joint Forces Command portfolio.

The centerpiece of the transition is reorganization centered on the Joint Staff J7 Directorate that better interacts and synchronizes adaptive joint training, doctrine, concept development and lessons learned supported by modeling, simulation and experimentation. Under this new construct, key functions and missions will now be linked together in a more efficient and effective manner under the Deputy Director Joint Staff J7 for Joint and Coalition Warfare – an organization that provides a one-stop-shop for preserving jointness and developing the joint force. This Joint Staff Directorate retains connections with Allied Command Transformation as well as multinational partners. To optimize synergy and prevent internally focused execution of individual functional tasking, this new organization provides direction, guidance, and internal and external coordination to ensure appropriate level of effort is dedicated toward desired outcomes in the form of cross-cutting Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,

Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) change recommendations.

For several reasons this new organization enjoys advantages its predecessor did not. This new integrated Joint Staff organization is optimized to be more responsive to the warfighter's demand signal than ever before. It will maintain engagements with combatant commanders and will holistically involve current operations to ensure lessons learned in the field are captured in doctrine and transferred rapidly into training. It will fulfill the warfighter's near term needs through adaptive training and product delivery. It will also address mid and far term warfighter needs through concept and doctrine development supported by modeling, simulation and lessons learned inputs. By leveraging modeling and simulation across the training and experimentation enterprises, we are better able to rapidly introduce new capabilities for the warfighter's mid and far term needs. In addition, a new synchronization and integration group provides an unprecedented capability for the Director Joint Staff J7 to align priorities, support DOTMLPF integration, rapidly transition concepts and lessons learned, leverage resources for a shared support environment, enhance engagement with our coalition and multinational partners, and increase situational awareness across the enterprise.

Other elements of US Joint Forces Command's Unified Command Plan responsibilities will similarly be restructured and executed within the Joint Staff. US Joint Forces Command's role in the Joint Force Provider will now be accomplished in the Director Joint Staff for Operations (J-3). Similarly, the US Joint Forces Command Director Joint Capability Development and Integration (J-8) will merge essential elements of the Joint Systems Integration Center and Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team into the organization to provide a comprehensive systems requirements identification and assessment capability, and will be reassigned to the Director Joint Staff Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J-8). Under the restructured Joint

Staff J-8, these functional capabilities will lead joint integration efforts for joint command, control, communications and computers capability development, integration and assessments in order to balance joint warfighter priorities with available resources. It will also have a clear linkage with the Director Joint Staff J7 to enable broad, comprehensive joint requirements definition and resultant solution sets. This relationship fosters a frame-work for current operations and training experiences to inform future capability development, ensuring we strike the appropriate balance between current warfighters' needs and preparing the future joint force to operate in an uncertain future environment.

We will also transfer uniquely joint operational capabilities currently providing services to the combatant commanders. The Joint Warfare Analysis Center is focused on joint targeting analysis and solutions, and the Joint Communications Support Element is focused on providing communications solutions that link service command and control systems together in a joint environment. The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency provides personnel recovery expertise and training to the combatant commanders. A new command, the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC), supports the establishment and operations of new joint headquarters. Under JECC, the Standing Joint Force Headquarters and Joint Public Affairs Support Element combination was expanded to include the Joint Communications Support Element in 2008 to provide a short duration capability to establish and operate joint task force headquarters. These organizations continue to provide unique joint capabilities not available in any of the services, and will be realigned to other combatant commands or defense organizations to provide complementary capabilities.

Finally, this overall efficiency effort and more direct integration with the Joint Staff reduces layers of oversight and additional support, allowing the organization to focus its attention on key joint areas, vital to meeting the needs of the combatant commander. As

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for ensuring jointness in the force, restructuring and realigning former US Joint Forces Command functional capabilities with appropriate Joint Staff Directors increases the Chairman's ability to ensure joint capabilities and readiness are maintained and promoted.

In summary, the time is right for the Department of Defense to focus on those critical functions that truly preserve and develop the future joint force. I have begun the process of transferring key functions to the Joint Staff and other appropriate Department entities. It is my intent that all remaining functions be transferred prior to disestablishment later this summer. Based on a more efficient, effective and streamlined approach to delivering joint operational capability, the restructured functional capabilities will be better able to establish priorities that support current efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan and all around the world. Equally important, through focused concept development, experimentations, lessons learned and doctrine, the Joint Staff will continue to maintain a forward-looking posture, avoid stagnation, and retain the ability to adapt to complex, ill-defined future adversaries. We will be poised to preserve joint readiness now and maintain it for future generations of joint warfighters.

On behalf of the men and women of United States Joint Forces Command, I thank you for this opportunity to report. I look forward to working with you to ensure the continuity of the joint force and the continued security of the United States.

Detailed Bio of General Odierno
As of: 060800DEC10

General Raymond T. Odierno, United States Army, commands United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). Headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, USJFCOM provides mission-ready joint-capable forces and supports the development and integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities to meet the present and future operational needs of the joint force.



General Odierno most recently served as Commanding General, Multi-National Force - Iraq and subsequently United States Forces - Iraq, from September 2008 until September 2010. He oversaw the transition from the Surge to Stability Operations and directed the largest redeployment of forces and equipment in the last 40 years.

General Odierno returned to Baghdad to assume command of Multi-National Force - Iraq fewer than 7 months after completing a 15-month deployment with III Corps from December 2006 to February 2008, during which he served as the Commanding General, Multi-National Corps - Iraq. As the day-to-day commander of coalition forces, General Odierno was the operational architect of the Surge and was responsible for implementing the counterinsurgency strategy that led to the dramatic decrease in violence in Iraq in 2007 and 2008. He is noted for being one of few Army generals in history to command a division, corps and entire theater during the same conflict. From October 2001 to June 2004, General Odierno commanded the 4th Infantry Division, leading the division throughout the first year of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from April 2003 to March 2004. The unit was headquartered in the restive Sunni triangle north of Baghdad and, in a significant accomplishment late in the deployment, Soldiers from the 4th Infantry Division captured former President Saddam Hussein near his hometown of Tikrit in December 2003.

A native of northern New Jersey, General Odierno attended the United States Military Academy at West Point, graduating in 1976 with a commission in Field Artillery. During more than 34 years of service, he has commanded units at every echelon, from platoon to theater, with duty in Germany, Albania, Kuwait, Iraq, and the United States. After his first assignment with U.S. Army Europe, General Odierno was assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery at Fort Bragg, N.C., where he commanded two batteries and served as a battalion operations officer.

Following advanced civilian and military schooling, General Odierno returned to U.S. Army Europe and the 7th Army, serving as a battalion executive officer, division artillery executive officer, and brigade executive officer, deploying in that capacity for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. He later commanded 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery, 7th Infantry Division, and the Division Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division.

Other significant assignments include: Arms Control Officer, Office of the Secretary of Defense; Chief of Staff, V Corps; Assistant Division Commander (Support), 1st Armored Division; Deputy Commanding General, Task Force Hawk, Albania; Director of Force Management, Office of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans; and Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C., where he was the primary military advisor to Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice. During this time, he accompanied the Secretary of State on all diplomatic journeys and state visits, traveling over 335,000 miles and visiting more than 65 countries, while attending international events ranging from summit meetings to earthquake relief efforts.

General Odierno holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering from West Point and a master's degree in Nuclear Effects Engineering from North Carolina State University. He holds a master's degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He is also a graduate of the Army War College.

Awards and decorations earned by General Odierno include three awards of the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, two awards of the Army Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal, six awards of the Legion of Merit, the Bronze Star Medal, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, four awards of the Meritorious Service Medal, the Army Commendation Medal, the Army Achievement Medal, and the Combat Action Badge. He received the highest award in the State Department, the Secretary of State Distinguished Service Medal, and recently the Romanian President awarded him the Romanian Order of Military Merit. General Odierno is the 2009 recipient of the Naval War College Distinguished Graduate Leadership Award for his strategic leadership and insight.

General Odierno has published articles on counterinsurgency operations in journals such as *Joint Forces Quarterly* and *Military Review* and has been featured in print media such as *Time Magazine*, *US News and World Report*, *Newsweek*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Washington Post*, *New York Times* and *Los Angeles Times*. He has also engaged with several news media outlets, to include NBC, CBS, ABC, FOX, CNN and the BBC. Recently, he has spoken with audiences at locations as diverse as New York University's Stern School of Business; the Council on Foreign Relations; the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C.; the National Committee on American Foreign Policy; the Ends of the Earth Club; the Union League Club of New York, where he received an achievement award for his lifetime of service to the nation; the Links Club; and the Colbert Report.

MARCH 2011

JOINT CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT AND EXPERIMENTATION

By Andrew F. Krepinevich

This testimony was presented before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Readiness on March 31, 2011

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you today, and to share my views on this important issue. My testimony is intended to provide a context within which one might assess Joint Forces Command's (JFCOM's) mission for joint concept development and experimentation in the wake of the command's disestablishment.

I proposed the idea of transforming Atlantic Command (ACOM) into Joint Forces Command and assigning it primary responsibility for U.S. military transformation while serving on the National Defense Panel. My colleagues on the Panel strongly shared my view that such a command is needed owing to the rapidly changing character of the military competition, stimulated by the accelerating tempo of technological advances and an international system in a state of flux. We proposed JFCOM with the understanding that its commander would be the sole senior officer whose primary mission was to speak for and support the "COCOMs-after-Next" (i.e., the COCOMs that would assume their commands 5-10 years in the future).¹

The command would accomplish this mission by identifying major emerging threats to our security as well as opportunities for addressing them. The goal was to anticipate threats and prepare for them, rather than having to react to them once they are upon us. On paper, this remains a central JFCOM mission. Today JFCOM's commander remains the only COCOM commander with a primary responsibility for positioning the U.S. military for the long-term future.

However, in reality, preparing for emerging challenges to national security has become a secondary mission, at best, both for the command and its commander. Established with the conversion of Atlantic Command to Joint Forces Command in 1999, JFCOM assumed responsibility for concept development and experimentation—the "futures" mission.

¹ See NDP, *Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century* (Washington, DC: National Defense Panel, December 1997), pp. 68–72.

Efforts to sustain the command's focus on providing a voice for the COCOMs-after-Next were hampered in 2003 when JFCOM's commander was assigned the responsibility as Supreme Commander, Allied Command Transformation.

In a sense, JFCOM has never fully liberated itself from its Atlantic Command ancestor. One might argue that it has always remained ACOM. JFCOM's *de facto* priority missions are "joint force provider" and "joint force trainer." These missions were assigned to ACOM in 1993, when it was given responsibility for conducting joint training of assigned CONUS-based forces, and preparing for review by the JCS Chairman joint force packages for worldwide employment. Indeed, JFCOM has been a magnet for Pentagon flotsam and jetsam organizations, and is sometimes referred to as "Velcro Command." The result has been a command being pulled in different directions and lacking overall focus. The mission that inspired its creation—joint concept development and experimentation—has been progressively marginalized.

Why are concept development and experimentation—properly done—so important? The matter merits some elaboration, and history offers an excellent guide. For over a century wargaming (and more recently simulations), along with other analytic tools, have played important roles in identifying new military systems and force elements, while also providing key insights needed for developing new operational concepts as well as weeding out those that have serious flaws. For example, the wargames conducted at the Naval War College in the early 1920s proved extremely useful in developing promising operational concepts for the use of naval air power, as well as the associated measures of effectiveness. Given the perennial challenge of limited time and resources under which military organizations must operate, well-designed and executed wargames and simulations can provide an invaluable service to those charged with the "futures" mission of concept development and experimentation.

However, experience shows that field exercises, and the experiments they make possible, play a critical role in enabling military organizations to anticipate major shifts in the competition—to anticipate change rather than having to react to it. Over the last century, military field exercises oriented on addressing emerging challenges and opportunities at the operational level of war have proven to be an important enabler of military innovation. Properly undertaken, field exercises are a source of great competitive advantage. Their benefits include:

- Reducing uncertainty concerning how best to meet emerging threats;
- Determining the proper mix of emerging and legacy systems in the future force;
- Enabling militaries to develop and evaluate a wide range of military capabilities and forms of operation, which can be fully and rapidly developed if and when a threat emerges;
- Generating successes that inspire enthusiasm for, and sustain the momentum of, military innovation;
- Complicating the planning of existing and would-be enemies;

- Identifying intra-regime shifts—major shifts in the military competition that, while they do not require large-scale transformation, do require the military to effect significant innovation;
- Helping to avoid premature, large-scale production of emerging systems that may appear promising but that actually offer little in terms of military capability; and
- Identifying and solving the practical problems inherent in developing new operations, force structures and systems that cannot be determined through wargames and simulations alone.

Because of these characteristics, military field exercises are especially beneficial during periods of high uncertainty and rapid change. Such a period exists today. The United States military confronts a highly dynamic international environment. It also must deal with rapid advances in military-related technologies that create great uncertainty with respect to what new military systems, organizations, concepts of operation, and force elements will emerge to supplant the existing military regime, and which will prove to be chimeras. Consequently, the potential for surprise is high during such periods, when the time available to respond to unexpected events is often exceedingly short.²

Military field exercises that incorporate experimentation can play an important role in reducing the uncertainty about the future conflict environment and those capabilities, force elements, and operational concepts that will dominate that environment. The ultimate expression of such efforts will likely be the conduct of joint exercises at the operational level of warfare. This is because joint operations (i.e., operations involving two or more of the military services) will almost certainly dominate future military operations, and because the operational level of war is the level at which military campaigns are conducted.

Unfortunately, the Defense Department's rhetoric asserting the need for concept development and experimentation has yet to be matched by any great sense of urgency or any substantial resource support. Those exercises that are undertaken typically focus on improving existing warfighting capabilities rather than on preparing to meet the threats and challenges of tomorrow.

History shows the importance of a vigorous, sustained, and informed approach to experimentation. In January 1929, the United States Navy undertook a major exercise, titled Fleet Problem IX, at a time when battleships were the ultimate expression of sea power. It was one of a series of over 20 major exercises undertaken by the Service during the years between the two world wars. Despite the isolationist mood of America at the time, compounded by tight military budgets and arms control constraints, the Navy persisted in conducting these exercises as, among other things, a means for determining the influence of continuing rapid advances in aviation technology upon sea power.

Fleet Problem IX took place off the coast of Panama. Present for the first time in the fleet problems were two ships of radically different design. These ships, the *Saratoga* and *Lexington*, were aircraft carriers. During the exercise, Vice Admiral William Pratt,

2. For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment* (Unpublished Paper, Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, DoD, July 1992); Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Keeping Pace with the Military Technological Revolution," *Issues in Science and Technology* (Summer 1994); and Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computers: The Pattern of Military Revolutions," *The National Interest* (Fall 1994).

commander-in-chief (CINC) of the U.S. fleet, authorized Rear Admiral Joseph Reeves, commanding the *Saratoga*, to execute a high-speed run toward the Panama Canal. Reeves then “attacked” the canal with a 70-plane strike force launched 140 miles from the target, stunning the wargame’s participants.³

Following Fleet Problem IX, Admiral Pratt observed, “I believe that when we learn more of the possibilities of the carrier we will come to an acceptance of Admiral Reeves’ plan which provides for a very powerful and mobile force . . . the nucleus of which is the carrier.”⁴ The following year, upon becoming Chief of Naval Operations, Pratt stressed that carriers be placed on the offensive in war games and fleet exercises. Through such exercises, involving experimentation with new kinds of equipment, doctrine and formations, Navy leaders sowed the seeds that brought forth the fast carrier task forces that revolutionized warfare at sea and enabled the U.S. Navy to defeat the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War II.

Eight years after Fleet Problem IX, on the North German Plain in Europe, a new and very different ground formation appeared in exercises conducted by the German Army: the panzer division. The panzer division was a combined arms formation possessing large numbers of fast tanks with substantial range and centered on a doctrine that called for rapid, deep penetration operations as a means for achieving victory. This represented a dramatic departure from Germany’s World War I experience against its principal enemy, France. That conflict was dominated by slow-moving forces employing heavy firepower and engaging in a gradual war of attrition.

In the maneuvers, after a 60-mile approach march, the panzer division went on the attack, forcing the “enemy” to commit its reserves. The following day the panzer division not only broke through the enemy front but also penetrated deep into its rear. The enemy’s position quickly became untenable, and the contest was essentially decided only four days into what had been planned as a seven-day exercise. General Franz Halder, like many others present who witnessed the spectacle (but who, unlike the others, would also become Chief of the German General Staff a year later), was stunned by the “fluid mobility” of the panzer operations.⁵

Many other field exercises were conducted during the 1920s and 1930s by the German military. They included not only experiments in mechanized warfare but also with various radio communications schemes and with aircraft to provide reconnaissance and close air support for rapidly moving ground forces. These exercises were indispensable in enabling the German high command to develop a devastating new form of land warfare known as *Blitzkrieg*—lightning war.

Again, today’s U.S. military finds itself not only at war in Afghanistan and Iraq, but also in a period somewhat similar to the one confronted by the two military organizations

3 Norman Friedman, Thomas C. Hone and Mark D. Mandel, *The Introduction of Carrier Aviation into the US Navy and Royal Navy: Military-Technical Revolutions, Organizations, and the Problems of Decision* (Unpublished Paper, May 12, 1994), p. 94.

4 Clark G. Reynolds, *The Fast Carriers* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1968), p. 17. Pratt flew his flag from the *Saratoga* on the return cruise, “partly as a badge of distinction, but most because I want to know what makes the aircraft squadrons tick.”

5 Robert M. Citino, *Path to Blitzkrieg* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 241.

cited above. As in the interwar era, rapidly progressing (and diffusing) technologies have emerged, laying the groundwork for disruptive changes in the military competition and the way in which military operations are conducted. But as with naval aviation and mechanized ground operations seventy years ago, it is not yet clear how the future will play out.

Field exercises that incorporate experimentation—at both the Joint and Service level—provide an indispensable means for resolving these questions and, in so doing, determining the proper mix of new and legacy systems required to operate effectively against future threats. Military field exercises at the operational level of warfare confer several critical benefits, both to defense planners and to those concerned with fiscal accountability. These benefits include:

- ***Reducing Uncertainty in Preparing for Emerging Threats.*** Through concept development and experimentation, commanders can develop a feel for those operations that might succeed in such a threat environment and for the force mix and systems requirements needed to support such operations. This proved to be the case with Germany's development of Blitzkrieg. Field exercises enabled the German military to work through the coordination problems associated with fast-moving mechanized formations, other ground formations and supporting air units. Equally important, field exercises also enable military leaders to determine those force elements and modernization plans that will likely diminish in value over time. For example, the Wehrmacht's field exercises in the 1930s helped convince the German Army's leadership that the horse cavalry's glorious epoch was rapidly drawing to a close.
- ***Determining the Proper Mix of Emerging and Legacy Systems.*** A vigorous and rigorous program of concept development and experimentation also assists military organizations in determining those new systems and capabilities that will be required, those existing (or legacy) systems and capabilities that should be sustained, and what kind of mix should be established between the two. The Germans, for instance, used a series of field exercises to experiment with five different mechanized field formations—three of which were eventually adopted. In the case of the panzer division, over the course of these exercises the Germans found their initial design was far too "tank heavy" in proportion to the other elements of the division, such as artillery and engineers. Consequently, the number of tanks in the initial division design was reduced by roughly 50 percent. The proportion of certain supporting forces, such as engineers, was increased. Finally, supporting elements, such as engineers, and legacy systems, such as artillery, were motorized to better enable them to support the tanks' rapid advance.⁶ In short, exercises proved critical to the Germans' ability to determine the proper mix of new (e.g., panzer, airborne, radio communications, and reconnaissance and attack aircraft) and existing (e.g., artillery, engineers) capabilities required for mechanized air-land operations.
- ***Reducing Uncertainty by Testing and Evaluating a Wide Range of Capabilities.*** Through concept development and experimentation, military

⁶ Werner Haupt, *A History of the Panzer Troops, 1916–1945* (West Chester, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1990), p. 72.

organizations can identify and refine new forms of operations and force elements, which can then be employed relatively quickly if and when a threat emerges. In this way field exercises enable innovation. For example, in the case of innovation, one sees that in the early 1960s the U.S. Army conducted extensive field exercises to assess the potential of airmobile and air-assault operations.⁷ These field exercises gave the Army an important option when, in the summer of 1965, it was ordered to deploy large combat forces to Vietnam. The first division selected for deployment was the Army's newly formed 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), the end product of a major innovation in land warfare.⁸ On a more profound level, the U.S. Navy's series of fleet problems enabled that Service to develop the principles of the fast carrier task force, which supplanted the battleship battle line as the dominant maritime formation for command of the seas. As a consequence of the fleet problems conducted during the 1920s and 1930s, when the battles of Coral Sea and Midway in 1942 clearly revealed the transformation of war at sea, the Navy was able to adapt quickly to conduct fast carrier task force operations.

• ***Generating Successes that Sustain Momentum for Innovation.*** One reason why military transformations typically require a decade or so to bring about is that they must overcome the resistance of large organizations to major change. This is especially true with respect to the U.S. military, which must contend with the additional burden of its remarkable success, but which today is very much absorbed in waging wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Thus, the U.S. military and its civilian leaders must be convinced that anticipating and preparing for emerging challenges is necessary and possible. A properly structured and funded concept development and experimentation program, to include involving actual forces in an environment that is as close to actual operations as possible, is arguably unsurpassed in their ability to generate support, and even enthusiasm, for innovation. The Saratoga's raid on the Panama Canal in Fleet Problem IX and the 3rd Panzer Division's performance in the German Army's North German Plain maneuvers convinced many of the officers that witnessed the exercise—in a way that no war game or simulation ever could have—that they were onto something special, that a dramatically new and more effective way of conducting military operations was indeed possible.⁹

7 These exercises culminated in the Air Assault I and Air Assault II major field exercises. For a discussion of these exercises, and the related Air Force Goldfire exercises, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 121–27.

8 The Army also considered fielding an Air Cavalry Brigade formation. For a discussion of the rise of airmobile/air assault forces in the US Army, see Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*, pp. 112–27. See also J. Kristopher Keener, *The Helicopter Innovation in United States Army Aviation* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, March 2001).

9 The same tends to be true of transformation in other large, competitive organizations. For example, see John Kotter, "Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail," *Harvard Business Review*, March–April 1995, pp. 59–67. Kotter emphasizes the importance of creating "short-term wins." He notes that "Most people won't go on in the long march unless they see compelling evidence within 12 to 24 months that the journey is producing expected results." Similarly, field exercises can do much to convince the officer corps that new warfare challenges are real and that there are innovative ways of dealing with them.

- ***Complicating the Planning of Would-Be Enemies.*** Field exercises that enable the U.S. military to buy options on emerging capabilities can also greatly complicate the planning of would-be adversaries. For example, in the 1930s the Imperial Japanese Navy was forced to plan against a U.S. Navy that was exploring a range of options for exploiting the potential of naval aviation, to include the deployment of large (e.g., *Saratoga* and *Lexington*) and small (e.g., *Ranger*) carriers, as well as “mid-sized” carriers (the *Yorktown* Class); the use of sea planes, airships, and land-based aircraft; as well as proposals for launching a class of flying-deck cruisers. By enabling the creation of a range of capabilities and warfighting options, experimentation can compel would-be adversaries to stretch their limited resources thin, or to take the high-risk option of focusing their efforts on offsetting only one or a few of the new warfighting options. Ideally, when confronted with this dilemma, potential adversaries would find themselves dissuaded from entering into a military competition in the first place.¹⁰

- ***Identifying Intra-Regime Shifts.*** Save warfare itself field exercises appear to be the best way to maintain an awareness of significant shifts in the character of military competition that sometimes occurs during periods of disruptive change, but which are not themselves disruptive. The U.S. Navy’s series of exercises and fleet problems conducted during the period between the world wars identified several such shifts. Tests on the battleship *Texas* in 1919 showed that aircraft acting as spotters greatly enhanced the battleship’s accuracy at extended ranges. Thus, while the carrier had not displaced the battleship, it had nevertheless become indispensable to its effectiveness. Ten years later, Fleet Problem IX showed that carriers could function as a significant strike force in a raid, even though they still had not displaced the battleship as the arbiter of sea control. It was not until the fleet problems of the late 1930s that a substantial number of naval officers became convinced that carrier-based aircraft might be true capital ship killers. In the absence of such fleet exercises, it is doubtful the Navy would have either identified these shifts in the military competition, or adapted to them as quickly and as well as it did.

¹⁰ Again, the highly competitive corporate sector offers instructive insight. The ability and the will to produce a range of capabilities can greatly complicate an adversary’s ability to compete. A classic example is the war waged between Honda and Yamaha for supremacy in the motorcycle market, known in Japanese business circles as the “H-Y War.” Yamaha was the “aggressor,” in that it built a factory that would enable it to become the world’s largest motorcycle manufacturer. The key to Honda defeating this challenge was its ability to rapidly increase the rate and range of change in its product line, which it used to bury Yamaha. At the war’s start, both firms had roughly 60 models of motorcycles. Over the next 18 months, Honda introduced or replaced 113 models, turning over its product line twice, while Yamaha could manage only 37 changes during that same time period. This parallels in rough fashion the US Navy’s development of a wide range of naval aviation “products” during the interwar years, and its ability to move rapidly to place them into the wartime “markets” (i.e., mission areas) where they were required. See George Stalk, Jr., “Time—The Next Source of Competitive Advantage,” *Harvard Business Review*, July-August 1988, pp. 44–45.

Similarly, were the U.S. military to conduct field exercises today to address the growing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threats¹¹ from China and Iran, they might reveal important

¹¹ As the Cold War drew to a close, the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment began exploring how conflicts might change now that the Soviet Union no longer posed a threat to the United States and given precision-guided warfare's demonstrated effectiveness in the First Gulf War. In the early 1990s I drafted a series of three assessments examining the issue of whether a military revolution, or dramatic shift, in the character of military competitions was underway. The assessments described what has become known as the anti-access/area-denial challenge. The final assessment, completed in November 1993, noted the following:

As peer competitors [i.e., states with military potential comparable to that of the United States] become increasingly proficient in exploiting advanced technologies . . . and as many Third World states acquire more destructive, extended-range weaponry, the conduct of forcible-entry operations will change dramatically. For peer competitor states operating against aggressor non-peer competitor states [i.e., states in the developing world], the threat environment could require that forcible entry operations be initiated at extended ranges (although they may be supported by infiltrated forces, like special operations forces) and by coalition partners or allies whose geographic location may place them, de facto, at close range with the aggressor. For peer competitors, the ever-increasing engagement envelopes of non-competitor states will likely alter dramatically traditional notions regarding the benefits of forward-deployed forces . . .

Forward bases—those huge, sprawling complexes that bring to mind such places as Malta, Singapore, Subic Bay, Clark Air Base, and Dhahran—will become great liabilities, not precious assets. The reason is simple: [as] Third World states acquire significant numbers of ranged-fire systems (i.e., ballistic and cruise missiles, high performance aircraft) and enormously more effective munitions (i.e., smart bombs; nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons), these bases' "sudden" vulnerability will deter their owners from acting to deter or thwart aggression. Their occupants will find themselves in the uncomfortable (and certainly unintended) role of hostages to the growing military capabilities of Third World nations. Rather than acting as a source of assurance to friends and allies in the region, these bases will be a source of anxiety . . . Rather than a source of stability in a crisis, the bases will likely encourage one side or both toward pre-emptive strikes: either against the base before its assets can be dispersed or against the potential aggressor in an attempt to disarm it of its ranged-fire strike capability.

Forward-deployed naval forces may be able to offset the future liabilities of forward bases, but only partially and probably not for very long, as currently configured. The traditional carrier task force or surface action group possesses neither the mobility nor the stealth to function as the spear tip of forcible entry operations.

Starting in the mid-1990s, senior US military leaders began voicing similar concerns over the US military's ability to deal with such contingencies. General Ronald Fogleman, then Air Force chief of staff, observed in 1996 that

Saturation ballistic missile attacks against littoral forces, ports, airfields, storage facilities, and staging areas could make it extremely costly to project US forces into a disputed theater, much less carry out operations to defeat a well-armed aggressor. Simply the threat of such enemy missile attacks might deter US and coalition partners from responding to aggression in the first instance.

Admiral Jay Johnson, then chief of naval operations, expressed very similar concerns when he declared

Over the past ten years, it has become evident that proliferating weapon and information technologies will enable our foes to attack the ports and airfields needed for the forward deployment of our land-based forces.

Perhaps most revealing, however, are the comments of a retired Indian brigadier general, who observed immediately following the First Gulf War that future access to forward bases

is, by far the trickiest part of the American operational problem. This is the proverbial "Achilles heel." India needs to study the vulnerabilities and create covert bodies to develop plans and execute operations to degrade these facilities in the run up to and after commencement of hostilities. Scope exists for low cost options to significantly reduce the combat potential of forces operating from these facilities.

If, as General Fogleman and Admiral Johnson observed, anti-access (A2) strategies aim to prevent US forces from operating from fixed land bases in a theater of operations, then area-denial (AD) operations aim to prevent the freedom of action of maritime forces operating in the theater. Admiral Johnson expressed these concerns when he declared

I anticipate that the next century will see . . . [our] foes striving to target concentrations of troops and materiel ashore and attack our forces at sea and in the air. This is more than a sea-denial threat or a Navy problem. It is an area-denial threat whose defeat or negation will become the single most crucial element in projecting and sustaining US military power where it is needed.

The concerns of military leaders were echoed by the National Defense Panel (NDP), formed by Congress in 1997 to review long-term US strategy. The NDP concluded that the threat to forward base access was real, and would almost certainly grow over time. The NDP therefore concluded that the United States "must radically alter" the way in which its military projects power.

Anti-access/area-denial operations can include coordinated operations by an enemy's air forces and integrated air defenses to maintain a degree of air parity or superiority over its territory and forces. Land-based A2/AD operations might include short- to medium-range artillery, rocket, or missiles strikes against US forward-based forces and forward-deploying forces (which can include forcible entry forces) at either their littoral penetration points or at air-landing points. These enemy forces can also be employed against friendly maritime forces, and may also include antiship cruise, or even ballistic, missiles and submarines armed with torpedoes or antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Closer to shore, sophisticated mines, coastal submarines, and small attack craft could be employed against US forces.

intra-regime shifts. For example, they may reveal that it is becoming prohibitively costly to deploy, sustain and operate U.S. forces from large, fixed forward bases, such as major ports and advanced air bases. It may also be possible, however, for the U.S. military to adapt itself so that it could still project decisive force in the absence of such base access. Either way it would be very useful to know whether there exist points of innovation that enable a significant—if not disruptive—shift in the military competition.

For instance, depending upon the relative success enjoyed by those militaries seeking to develop A2/AD capabilities and those seeking to defeat them, one side or the other might gain an advantage for a limited period of time. If A2/AD capabilities gain the upper hand, this would be important to know, lest U.S. forces find themselves confronted with latter-day versions of Omaha Beach, Anzio and Tarawa as they attempt to deploy and sustain themselves through major forward bases. If, on the other hand, U.S. concept development and experimentation initiatives enable power-projection forces to gain a clear (albeit evanescent) advantage, it would be important to know, both for deterrence and warfighting purposes. For instance, at some point in its transformation the U.S. military might have created, in essence, a spearhead force capable of swiftly defeating a nascent anti-access threat, thereby enabling the prompt, effective use of follow-on legacy forces in more traditional operations.¹² Obviously, the matter of whether such a capability does, in fact, reside within the U.S. military would be of critical importance. As the U.S. Navy's fleet problems indicate, properly designed and executed concept development, gaming and field exercises offer perhaps the best opportunity to identify and monitor whether the U.S. military possesses such a "spearhead capability" and to determine when intra-regime shifts are occurring.

- ***Avoiding the Premature Large-Scale Production of New Military Systems***

- ***Avoiding "False Starts."*** Field exercises, especially those that incorporate experiments, can help military organizations avoid buying large quantities of a promising system too early during a period of transformational change in military capabilities. The U.S. Navy's first carrier designed from the keel up, the *Ranger*, was commissioned in 1934. Although some Navy leaders had pressed for construction of five *Ranger*-Class carriers, war game analysis and fleet problems soon indicated that, at roughly 14,000 tons, the *Ranger* was far too small to meet many of the demands of future fleet operations. As it turned out, the *Essex*-Class carriers that formed the backbone of the Navy's fast carrier task forces in World War II each displaced nearly twice as much tonnage as the *Ranger*.

- ***Avoiding "Dead Ends."*** Military systems or capabilities that appear promising, or even revolutionary, sometimes fail to live up to expectations. In this case, the challenge of those leading the effort is not to avoid buying them too early; rather, it is to avoid buying them at all. The experience of the U.S.

¹² In fact, the US military's possession of such a capability appears to be a key assumption of the Air Force's Global Strike Task Force, the Navy's Assured Access, and the Army's Objective Force warfighting concepts.

Navy during the development of naval aviation in the interwar period again provides an example of how rigorous experimentation and field exercises can help avoid dead ends. In 1930 the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics proposed the construction of eight 10,000-ton flying-deck (or flight-deck) cruisers. The ships—half cruiser and half flight deck—were subjected to war game analysis at the Naval War College and some experiments employing surrogates in the fleet. Both painted a distinctly unfavorable picture of the hybrid ship, and it quickly sank beneath the Navy's programmatic waves.

• **Identifying and Solving Practical Problems.** Although important in their own right, planning exercises, simulations and war games can only go so far in identifying new forms of operation and new military system requirements.¹³ Indeed, even the best war games have serious limitations. War games can be very helpful in providing useful insights; however, they do not offer the detailed level of resolution obtained from well-designed and executed field exercises. This drawback is critical for in war, as with many other things, the devil is often in the details. For example, war games conducted at the Naval War College in the early 1920s indicated the importance of maximizing carrier aircraft complements and aircraft sortie rates.¹⁴ It was not, however, until a prototype carrier (the Langley) was launched that the Navy could determine precisely how this goal was to be achieved (or, indeed, whether it could be achieved at all). Under Captain Joseph Reeves, the Langley conducted a series of exercises and experiments that led to such innovations as crash barriers and the deck park, which enabled the ship to more than double its aircraft complement and dramatically increase its sortie rate.¹⁵ Similarly, the German Army's field exercises and operations in the late 1930s enabled it to solve critical issues with respect to fuel and spare parts requirements for its panzer formations, and the means by which the German Air Force, the Luftwaffe, would function as a highly mobile source of reconnaissance and fire (close air) support. Field exercises like these were essential to both militaries' efforts to transform and dominate the emerging conflict environment.

If history is any guide, and if the Defense Department is serious about transforming the U.S. military, then **concept development and experimentation oriented on that goal must be initiated now and conducted on a frequent basis.** Moreover,

¹³ As noted earlier, planning exercises, simulations and war games are important analytic tools that can greatly enhance the effectiveness of field exercises by identifying those promising capabilities that merit prototyping, those new force elements that should be established, and operational concepts that merit the detailed evaluation that only field exercises can provide. Thus these analytic devices serve as a filter to enhance the focus and value of field exercises. This is critical as field exercises are far more costly to undertake (and thus are conducted far less frequently) than war games, simulations or planning exercises.

¹⁴ A sortie is one mission flown by one aircraft.

¹⁵ Norman Friedman, "The Aircraft Carrier," in *The Eclipse of the Big Gun: The Warship, 1906–1945*, ed. Robert Gardiner (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992), p. 39; and Reynolds, *Admiral John H. Towers*, p. 205.

funding, forces and equipment (to include rapidly prototyped equipment and surrogates) must be made available to support these exercises.

Recall that during the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s, the U.S. Navy conducted twenty-one fleet problems involving large elements of the fleet. Some fleet problems were so extensive that they comprised several major phases, each of which could have been viewed as an independent exercise. The German Army continually found ways to conduct substantial field exercises even during Germany's period of disarmament from 1919–35. Following the onset of rearmament, the German military moved quickly to conduct the largest field exercises of the interwar period, while concurrently conducting major operations in the Spanish Civil War.

Both of these militaries were animated by a sense of urgency among their military leaders that rapid (and perhaps profound) changes in the threat environment or character of the conflict were possible, if not imminent. The U.S. Navy was acutely aware of the growing challenge posed by the Imperial Japanese Navy, both in terms of its growing strength and its efforts to exploit the potential of naval aviation. The German Army was driven by the need to avoid a protracted war of attrition on multiple fronts, the type that led to its defeat in World War I. This led to the *Wehrmacht's* vigorous efforts to exploit rapidly advancing technologies (i.e., automotive, aviation, radio) to restore mobility to the battlefield. The urgent need to keep pace with the competition, to determine as best as possible the direction warfare was headed, and to reduce uncertainty about what new (and legacy) capabilities would prove effective (and which would not), led these innovative militaries to exploit the potential of field/fleet exercises with a keen sense of urgency.

Today the character of conflict is shifting once again, and the U.S. military must innovate and adapt to maintain its competitive position. Unfortunately, Joint Forces Command—whose creation was stimulated through Congressional pressure—has never, despite the efforts of many dedicated individuals, fulfilled its mission of anticipating and preparing the U.S. military to meet emerging challenges.

While field exercises designed to identify and exploit promising paths toward military transformation must be vigorous, sustained and comprehensive, history also indicates that their principal focus should be oriented on ***meeting challenges (or exploiting opportunities) at the operational level of warfare***. Moreover, such field exercises must be directed at preparing forces for the challenges of the next war, not at becoming more proficient at waging the last one. Concepts of operation for dealing with emerging threats can be viewed as the point in transformation where the rubber meets the road. Such new concepts, particularly in their early forms, represent educated judgments about what new mix of force elements and capabilities will be required to operate effectively in the new competitive environment. As such, they constitute a very significant initial effort to identify the winners and losers that will emerge out of military transformation.

As noted above, failing to take these factors into consideration runs the risk that field exercises will arrive at some very good solutions to the wrong problems. This, regrettably, is all too often the case with current field exercises. To be sure, some progress has been

made. For example, there is growing acceptance within the U.S. military of the anti-access and area-denial threats to U.S. power-projection capabilities. But progress has been fitful at best. For example, the Air Force and Navy are still struggling to develop an AirSea Battle concept to address the A2/AD challenge well over a decade after their Service chiefs identified the challenge.

There is a possible explanation for why we have, thus far, seen so little in the way of specifics when it comes to concepts of operation. First, presenting detailed operational concepts for dealing with the anti-access/area-denial threat and other challenges would inevitably lead to a significantly different force structure and systems requirement mix—i.e., significant changes in the Services' current program of record. By identifying "losers" within its own projected force, a Service runs the risk of having these programs attacked by other Services competing for limited resources. It also may encounter opposition from its own subcultures that stand to see their relative stature within the Service decline.

The absence of specificity and alternatives with respect to current Service concepts of operation is reflected in the absence of a healthy competition among the Services to determining the new force structure, system and program changes required to adapt the U.S. military to address emerging challenges. This is regrettable, as inter-Service competition along these lines could provide a strong impetus for generating the innovation required to enable transformation.

JFCOM's "futures" mission remains too critical to ignore. Among the worrisome developments demanding our attention:

- China is fielding what the Pentagon terms anti-access/area-denial forces, including growing numbers of ballistic missiles and submarines designed to deny the United States the ability to protect its allies and interests in the Western Pacific. How should our military best preserve a stable military balance under these circumstances?
- We are witnessing the gradual diffusion of guided rockets, artillery, mortars and missiles (known as "G-RAMM") to irregular forces. For example, in 2006, Hezbollah's use of these weapons prompted the evacuation of over 100,000 Israelis from their homes and the shutdown of Israel's oil distribution system. How should the U.S. military prepare for G-RAMM as the "next big thing" in irregular warfare?
- Defending maritime commerce against G-RAMM-armed adversaries promises to be a highly challenging proposition. This applies not only to commercial shipping, but also the trillions of dollars in economic infrastructure on the U.S. continental shelf, including offshore oil and gas rigs and wells and fiber optic cables. In a world in which South American drug cartels now ship their illegal cargo via unmanned underwater vehicles, the ability to inflict major damage on the U.S. economy is increasingly within the reach of non-state groups. How should our military respond to this growing threat?

- Our military is critically dependent upon satellites for everything from communications to target identification to payload delivery. China has demonstrated a growing ability to disable or destroy these satellites, and other countries may follow suit. How should the U.S. military adapt its space architecture? What alternatives might allow the United States to reduce its reliance on satellites for precision navigation, intelligence-gathering and long-distance communication?

These are exactly the kinds of challenges and the important questions that JFCOM was created to address.

Regardless of the ultimate fate of JFCOM, there remains an urgent need to develop innovative military operations with an eye toward creating the forces and capabilities needed to present an effective counter response. Simultaneously, we also need to identify lower priority military systems that can be responsibly curtailed or eliminated in an era of declining defense budgets.

Done well, this effort could enable our military to get out in front of emerging challenges, and discourage potential rivals from pursuing aggressive actions against the United States, our friends and allies, and our global interests.

JFCOM's overarching mission must have a home somewhere. Equally important, JFCOM's future mission deserves the strongest possible support from senior Defense Department policymakers and military leaders. Although JFCOM is being disbanded, its core missions must be sustained. As noted above, the "joint force trainer" and "joint force provider" missions have occupied much of the command's attention and appear to have found "homes." The orphan mission—joint concept development and experimentation—has always been at the margins, despite being the inspiration for the command's creation. Unless steps are taken to ensure it is finally given the priority it deserves, I suspect we are in for a future in which we find ourselves reacting to our enemies' stratagems rather than anticipating them.

The potential gains from a properly directed and funded field exercise campaign are clear. One only has to look at how blitzkrieg upset the military balance in Europe and how the U.S. Navy's fast carrier task forces turned the tide in the Pacific during World War II to see the payoff of successful military transformation. By extension, the importance of a well-designed program of concept development, war gaming, simulations and field exercises that incorporate high-fidelity experimentation is also shown. The cost of such an initiative would run under one percent of the U.S. defense budget. The risks associated with downplaying the need to anticipate disruptive changes in the military competition are also clear. They include investing in false starts and dead ends, arriving at the "right" solutions to the wrong threats, and, ultimately, the prospect of paying a price measured in jeopardized security interests, national treasure, and the lives of young American service men and women.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee

About the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA's goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy and resource allocation.

CSBA provides timely, impartial and insightful analyses to senior decision makers in the executive and legislative branches, as well as to the media and the broader national security community. CSBA encourages thoughtful participation in the development of national security strategy and policy, and in the allocation of scarce human and capital resources. CSBA's analysis and outreach focus on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to US national security. Meeting these challenges will require transforming the national security establishment, and we are devoted to helping achieve this end.

**DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION**

Witness name: Dr. Andrew Krepinevich

Capacity in which appearing: Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

FISCAL YEAR 2011

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
DoD/ONA	DoD	1,360,000	Assessment/analysis, wargames and briefings on strategic challenges and future warfare
DLA Acquisition Directorate	National Defense University	\$75,000	Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows Program Orientation

FISCAL YEAR 2010

federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
DoD/ONA	DoD	\$3,000,000	Assessments/analysis, wargames, and briefings on international security environment, strategic challenges, future warfare, and portfolio rebalancing
DLA Acquisition Directorate	National Defense University	\$75,000	Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows Program Orientation
Department of the Interior	DARPA	\$815,000	Real Time Sensor Simulation: IR Sensor Modeling in Real Time Simulations Study

FISCAL YEAR 2009

Federal grant(s) / contracts	federal agency	dollar value	subject(s) of contract or grant
US Marine Corps	DoD	\$65,000	External review of Vision and Strategy and other strategy documents
US Air Force	DoD	\$250,000	Red Teaming, Analytical and Facilitation support to AF/A8X Strategic Planning

DoD/ONA	DoD	\$3,000,000	Assessments/analysis, wargames, and briefings on international security environment, strategic challenges, future warfare, and portfolio rebalancing
OSD/OFT	DoD	\$245,000	Transformation Roadmap Irregular Warfare

Federal Contract Information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2011): 2 _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: 3 _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: 6 _____.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2011): 2 _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: 3 _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: 1 _____.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2011): Research and Analysis Services _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: Research and Analysis Services _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: Research and Analysis Services _____.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2011): \$1,435,000 _____;
 Fiscal year 2010: \$3,900,000 _____;
 Fiscal year 2009: \$4,900,000 _____.

Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government: NO GRANTS
 2009-2011

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held: NO GRANTS 2009-2011

Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich

President, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments



Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. is President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, an independent policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking about defense planning and investment strategies. He assumed this position 17 years ago following a 21-year career in the U.S. Army.

Dr. Krepinevich's previous experience includes service in the Department of Defense's Office of Net Assessment, and on the personal staff of three secretaries of defense. He also served as a member of the National Defense Panel in 1997 and the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Experimentation in 2002-03. He currently serves on Joint Forces Command's Transformation Advisory Board and the Secretary of Defense's Defense Policy Board.

Dr. Krepinevich frequently contributes to print and broadcast media and has appeared on each of the major television networks. Dr. Krepinevich has lectured before a wide range of professional and academic audiences, and has served as a consultant on military affairs for many senior government officials, including several secretaries of defense, the CIA's National Intelligence Council, and all four military services. He has testified frequently before Congress and advised the governments of several close allies on defense matters. Dr. Krepinevich has taught on the faculties of West Point, George Mason University, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and Georgetown University.

In 2009, Dr. Krepinevich released 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century. His other recent works include monographs for CSBA: Regaining Strategic Competence; Nuclear Forces: Meeting the Challenges of a Proliferated World; An Army at the Crossroads; Defense Investment Strategies in an Uncertain World; The Challenges to US National Security; and Dissuasion Strategy. Dr. Krepinevich is a recipient of the 1987 Furniss Award for his book, The Army and Vietnam.

A graduate of West Point, Dr. Krepinevich holds an MPA and Ph.D. from Harvard University. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 31, 2011

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES

Mr. FORBES. If similar functions to JFCOM exist within the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other organizations, was there any consideration given to consolidating those functions at JFCOM, rather than disestablishing JFCOM? For those functions that will continue, what process is DOD using to determine which function and where or by whom it should be performed?

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and NATO have built strong ties to JFCOM in areas of training, capability development, experimentation, and coalition forces integration.

- How will this progress be sustained and which U.S. commander and staff will assume counterpart responsibilities to ACT's NATO four-star commander?
- What is your plan to ensure that our allies have access to joint operability doctrine without a combatant command to coordinate and lead them?

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. We have become heavily reliant on the Navy and Air Force to provide individual augmentees to meet ground force requirements in CENTCOM. When this practice started several years ago it was supposed to be a "temporary fix" to the imbalance in the force. In the long term, DOD should right-size its forces structure to ensure that taskings for CENTCOM are filled with the best qualified individual for the task and not a surrogate from a different Service with different core competencies—a function that JFCOM was well positioned to address since it played a vital role in the improving the processes for assignments and development of training standards for these taskings.

- With the JFCOM disestablishment, how will DOD ensure that policies, procedures and training for these cross-service taskings don't fall through the cracks again?

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. Secretary Gates, in announcing the closure of JFCOM, stated that it was not needed because jointness was part of today's military culture. In reality we must continue to advance the concept of military jointness.

- However, without a body that has the authority to "force" that on the services, how can we be assured this will actually happen?
- How do we ensure that the services pay more than simple lip service to jointness?

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. Does Title 10, United States Code, prevent the CJCS from executing certain functions currently being done by JFCOM in support of the COCOMs?

- Which commander will be assigned the missions specifically assigned to JFCOM in the Unified Command Plan in accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act?

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. The tension between joint needs and service-centric processes has led some functions, such as special forces and missile defense, to migrate to department-wide entities.

- Is there an authoritative process for defining near- and long-term joint capability needs?
- If so, who is, or should be, responsible for managing that and for validating those requirements?

General ODIERNO. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. FORBES. With the disestablishment of JFCOM, who should be assigned the responsibility of joint force provider? If it were assigned to the JCS, is there adequate legal or statutory authority to do so?

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